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THE NAME GAME - PLAYING TO WIN
UNDER § 9-402 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
Julianna J. Zekan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code' appears to be
straightforward and simple to interpret. 2 Yet it has provoked extensive litigation, generated thousands of pages of judicial opinions, and
created unnecessary uncertainty arising from non-uniform practices
and decisions. 3 This Article examines the requirements of Section 9* Assistant Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; J.D. 1977, Georgetown
University School of Law; M.A. 1975, Harvard University; B.A. 1973, University of Pennsylvania. The author expresses her sincere appreciation to Professor William F. Young, Columbia
University School of Law, to Donald J. Rapson, Assistant General Counsel to the CIT Group
Holdings, Ine, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law and Columbia University School of Law, to Professors Irene Johnson, Jay Carlisle and Donald
Doernberg, Pace University School of Law, and to Professor Neil Cohen, Brooklyn Law
School, for their review and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. With deepest gratitude
and respect, this work is dedicated to the author's parents, Josephine Yalch Zekan and Julius
George Zekan, M.D.
1. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1989) [hereinafter "Code" or "U.C.C."]. All references are to sections of the U.C.C. as numbered in the 1989 Code, unless otherwise noted.
2. Section 9-402(1) provides that "[a] financing statement is sufficient if it gives the
names of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, . . . gives a mailing
address of the debtor." U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1989). For the balance of the relevant text of
Section 9-402(1), see infra text accompanying note 20. Section 9-402(8) articulates the standard to evaluate legal sufficiency as follows: "A financing statement substantially complying
with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are
not seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989). The absence of a consistent application
of this standard belies the simplicity of its statement.
3. Compare In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that only a
minor error occurred when the name "Excel Department Stores" was used instead of "Excel
Stores, Inc.") with First Manufactured Hous. Credit Corp. v. Clarkson Mobile Home Park,
Inc., 148 A.D.2d 901, 539 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1989) (holding that in order to perfect a security
interest, it is seriously misleading to list the debtor's middle and last names on the financing
statement without also listing the debtor's first name); compare Willson v. Habersham Bank,
III Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (holding that under Georgia law, filing the financing statement in the trade name rather than the legal name was sufficient) with Cain v. L.B. Smith,
Inc. (In re Stebow Construction Co., Inc.), 73 Bankr. 459, 464-67 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987) (hold365
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402, analyzes judicial approaches to the problems arising thereunder
with respect to notice, and suggests judicial, administrative and legislative reforms. It concludes that the judiciary should apply a twotier test to interpret § 9-402(8) and deny perfected status in the absence of the availability of actual notice, that the administrative offices should cooperate to establish consistent routine procedures and
conventions with respect to filing and retrieval methods, and that the

Code should be amended to specifically require the use of the
debtor's legal name on the financing statement.
A.

Article Nine's Notice Filing System

Article Nine, now the law in all fifty states,4 governs virtually
all transactions secured by an interest in personal property given
through the consent of the debtor to the secured party.5 It provides
ing that use of the debtor's trade name is insufficient to protect the creditor's rights); compare
Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce (Henry House Packing, Co.), 509 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th
Cir. 1975) (holding that the correct question to be answered was not what was the true name
of the entity which survived a merger but rather "whether creditors of the corporation would
have been seriously misled.") and Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that the use of the trade name rather than the legal name
was fatal to the perfection of the security interest) with National Cash Register Co. v. Danning (In re Thrift Shoe Co.), 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that California law, at
that time, required both the debtor's legal name and trade name to perfect a security interest)
and Lines v. National Cash Register Co. (In re Green Mill Inn, Inc.), 474 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that an ambiguous financing statement which named an individual as debtor
but carried the signature of a corporation, substantially complied with the statute because
cross-indexing by the Secretary of State would provide actual notice to creditors); compare
National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir.
1983) (finding that the security interest was properly perfected notwithstanding that it was
filed in the sole proprietor's trade name) and Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.),
642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (holding that the debtor using its trade name,
instead of its legal name, was not seriously misleading) with Northern Commercial Corp. v.
Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that where an individual
purchased equipment in his personal capacity, filing a financing statement under a trade name
was insufficient) and Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F.Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga.) (holding that the
security interest was not properly perfected because the use of the trade name rather than the
personal name of the debtor was seriously misleading), affd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979).
4. For a comprehensive list of references to the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted
in the various states, see 1 U.L.A. 1, 1-2 (1989).
5. U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-203 (1989). In a secured credit transaction the creditor obtains
the debtor's promise to repay the debt and in addition obtains the debtor's agreement giving an
interest to the creditor in some item or items of the debtor's property of equivalent value to
secure payment. R. SPEIDEL, S. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL LAW 17-18 (4th ed.
1987). The debtor either gives possession of the collateral securing its obligation to the creditor, U.C.C. §§ 9-305, 9-304(1) (1989), or the debtor retains possession of the collateral and
signs a security agreement evidencing the transaction and describing the collateral, id. §§ 9203, 1-201(37). If the debtor fails to pay the debt, the secured creditor is entitled to the rights
and remedies of Article 9, Part 5 which include taking possession and disposing of the property
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for a self-sufficient system whereby potential creditors may learn of

the existence of any security interest in the debtor's personal property by reference to financing statements6 filed in the public record.7

A properly completed and filed financing statement is the key to the
entire notice filing system upon which Article Nine relies" because it
provides the link between subsequent creditors and existing secured

parties who have given value to the debtor.
Absent such a filing, the potential for defrauding future creditors exists, particularly if the debtor retains the collateral in its possession.9 A potential creditor, unaware of the interest in the collateral claimed by the earlier creditor, may lend to the debtor in the
belief that the property is unencumbered.' The filing and retrieval
of a properly completed financing statement permits the secured

party to establish its seniority and prevents a subsequent creditor
from being misled by the appearance of assets in the debtor's possession. The financing statement thereby protects both the filer and the
subsequent creditor who searches the record."
in satisfaction of the debt pursuant to U.C.C. §§ 9-503 and 9-504.
6. A financing statement is a notice of the potential existence of a transaction between
the debtor and a secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-402 official comment 2 (1989). Article Nine
simply requires the filing of a notice of the transaction and does not require the filing of the
entire document describing the transaction between the debtor and the secured party. Id. § 9302.
7. The proper place to file in the state is identified in Section 9-402(1) of the Code.
8. Brown v. Belarus Machinery, Inc. (In re Service Lawn & Power, Inc.), 83 Bankr.
515 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
9. Notice filing enables the debtor to retain possession, the creditor to establish its seniority, and a prospective creditor not to be misled by the appearance of assets in the debtor's
possession. See id. at 519 (discussing the purpose of a financing statement). To motivate the
creditor to publish notice of its interest for the protection of others the creditor is denied
protected status of its own interest unless the notice provisions of the statute are satisfied. The
basic premise of Article 9 is to invalidate secret consensual liens. Johnson, Changes in the
Uniform Commercial Code, 19 IND. L. REV. 99, 110 n.97 (1986).
10. Traditionally, a secured transaction took the form of a pledge in which the debtor
delivered to the creditor physical possession of the personalty securing the debt at the time the
debt was incurred. Possession of the collateral by the secured party prevented the debtor from
using the same collateral to obtain additional credit from another source. Retention by the
debtor of pledged property was perceived as a fraud against all others not party to the initial
credit transaction, because possession by the debtor could potentially mislead others into thinking that the possessor had exclusive rights to the property. This principle is illustrated by the
famous Twyne's Case, Star Chamber, 3 Coke 80b, 70 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601), which was described under the fraudulent conveyance statute of 13 Eliz., ch. 5- (1571).
11. For a discussion of the protections that were contemplated by the drafters, see Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code (May 18, 1950), in
TRANSCRIPT OF DISCUSSION ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, JOINT MEETING: THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 241-50 (May 1950), reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, SEC. J,
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The independent reference system created by Article Nine 12
hinges upon the proper identification of the debtor to guard against
the potential dangers of "hidden liens." 13 The debtor's name functions as the password to effective communciation between the subsequent creditor and the filer. The debtor is identified by name on the
financing statement 14 which is then filed alphabetically by the
debtor's name.' 5
By searching under the debtor's name one would expect to retrieve the financing statements filed against the debtor to determine
the existence of prior claims. However, if one name is used for the
debtor in filing, and a different name is used in the search process
the filing may not be discovered. For example, the filing may have
been made under a misstated name, an incorrectly spelled name, or
under the debtor's trade name. 16 By contrast, the subsequent creditor

may search only for filings made under the debtor's legal name, and
the filings under a name other than the legal name may not be disclosed. Since a debtor may have more than one name, the only truly
reliable password representing the debtor is the debtor's legal name.
U.C.C., roll 14, at J.XII.l.i (microfilm).
12. Reliance on an independent public system of notice instead of on the debtor operates
as a deterrant against collusion between debtor and creditor to recharacterize their situation to
one more favorable than the facts justify. See Baird & Jackson, Possessionand Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 184-86 (1983).
13. Star Chamber (Twyne's Case), 3 Coke 80b, 70 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601); 13 Eliz., ch. 5
(1571) (Fraudulent Conveyances). See generally McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not
Find" Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 953 (1985) (discussing problems with the
U.C.C. regarding filing requirements).
14. See U.C.C. § 9-402(3) (1989) (describing a sample financing statement). The first
entry on the form is for the name of the debtor. For a more detailed description of the form
and instructions to complete the financing statement, see Hillman, Drafting Financing Statements, 44 J. NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 102, 103 (1970). The form of financing statement relevant
to this discussion has not changed in nearly forty years. Compare U.C.C. § 9-402 (1953) with
U.C.C. § 9-402 (1962) and U.C.C. § 9-402 (1972) and U.C.C. § 9-402 (1989) and U.C.C.
§ 9-402 (1990).
15. U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1989) (providing that "the filing officer shall index the statement according to the name of the debtor and shall note in the index the file number and the
address of the debtor given in the statement.").
16. A trade name is a name under which a person conducts business. Synonyms for
trade names include fictitious or assumed names. For example, the local laundromat owned by
Joan E. Jones may be known as "Willie's Wishee Washee Laundry." This sole proprietorship
may be indicated on a document as "Joan E. Jones d/b/a Willie's Wishee Washee Laundry,"
"D/b/a" is the acronym for "doing business as." Corporations and partnerships may also do
business under trade names. The trade name "Willie's Wishee Washee Laundry" has no resemblance to the legal name Joan E. Jones. A corporate name, such as "Laundry and Dry
Cleaning Network, Inc." may be misstated as "Laundry Network, Inc."
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Moreover, the ever increasing volume of filings and steady conversion to electronic data input and retrieval systems 17 practically compel the use of the debtor's legal name on the financing statement.
The key to the successful operation of the notice filing system, then,
is the debtor's legal name on the financing statement.
If the debtor is misnamed on the financing statement, a priority
conflict may ensue between competing creditors. Such conflicts are
too frequent to be ignored, and have occasioned judicial amazement
at the creativity of creditors to invent new ways to state the debtor's
name."8 The profusion of judicial responses attests to the gravity of
the debtor name issue, and to the ambiguities of Section 9-402.
Courts have yet to reach consensus on the meaning of § 9-402 or
even on the approach to interpretation.'" If the system is to operate
effectively there must be consensus on the basic requirements.
B. Section 9-402 Ambiguities
Section 9-402 describes the basic elements of a financing statement as follows:
§9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement ....
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of
the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an

address of the secured party from which information concerning
the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of
the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or
describing the items, of collateral. A financing statement may be
filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches. .

.

. A copy of the security agreement is sufficient

as a financing statement if it contains the above information and is
signed by the debtor.20
The section caption notwithstanding, 2 ' the absence of explicit
mandatory language invites debate on what constitutes a legally sufficient financing statement. A financing statement is "sufficient" if it
contains the information described in Section 9-402, but "sufficient"
17. J. Zekan, Survey of the Fifty States on the Systems, Procedures, and Methods of
Filing (May-Nov. 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
18.. See In re Jones, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 249, 250 (W.D. Mich. 1972).

19. The variety of judicial approaches has resulted in a "hodgepodge of inconsistent
decisions and unpredictable rules." Self, Secured Transactions Filings Under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code: A Call for Procedural Notice, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REy. 111, 111

(1985).
20.
21.

U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1989) (unchanged in relevant part since 1972).
Section captions are parts of the Code. U.C.C. § 1-109 (1989).
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is not defined. The ambiguous wording suggests that a financing
statement might be sufficient if it offers less information or information other than that specified in Section 9-402(1). It is clear that a
financing statement will be "sufficient" if it contains the information
described, but it is not as clear that all of the items listed are necessary. Moreover, the sufficiency language leaves open the possibility
that a financing statement might be sufficient if it offers information
other than that specified in Section 9-402(1).22 Borrowing from another context in the Code,2" the test of sufficiency might be that the
financing statement do the job assigned to it-that the financing
statement make possible the notice to a subsequent creditor of a preexisting security interest in the debtor's collateral. In order to provide notice, the financing statement must be discoverable in response
to a request for any financing statements filed in the name of the
debtor. The search depends upon proper identification of the debtor
at the time the financing statement is filed, so that the financing
statement is in the location that will be searched. In order to "do the
job assigned to it," the legal sufficiency of the financing statement is
therefore dependent upon compliance with the "name of the debtor"
requirement"' in a manner calculated to give effective notice.
It is not clear why the Code speaks in terms of "sufficiency"
rather than "requirements. 25 In part, the sufficiency language may
have been selected to emphasize the new Code rule that it was
enough to file a notice of the transaction instead of the pre-Code
obligation to place the entire agreement of the parties on public record.26 The drafters were concerned that a technically imperfect fi22.

The statutory language does not rule out the possibility that a filing in the assumed
OF THE LAW UNDER THE

name might be sufficient. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-16, at 959 (2d ed. 1980).

23. See U.C.C. § 9-110 official comment (1989) (stating that "[t]he test of sufficiency of
a description . . . is that the description do the job assigned to it-that it make possible the
identification of the thing described."). Section 9-110 applies to the description of personal
property. Id. § 9-110.
24. The financing statement must also satisfy the other requirements set forth in U.C.C.
§ 9-402(1) (1989), which include a proper description of the collateral, the signature of the
debtor, and the name and address of the secured party.
25. See Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1986). Professor Carlson posits that with respect to
Article 9 there was no single legislative intent, and that the statutory language of Article 9
priorities was the product of unintended drafting error. Id. at 207-210. But see In re Osborn, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 227, 231 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (stating that "[i]t was the intent
of the drafters that the filing officer be furnished with a 'name of the debtor.' ").
26. U.C.C. § 9-402 official comment 2 (1989).
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nancing statement might be invalidated by the courts,"7 and that

rigid language might encourage too strict a construction. The sufficiency language appears to be drafted in reaction to improvident de-

cisions that construed requirements strictly without regard to substantive effect. 8 The sufficiency language is not intended to abolish
requirements, but to enforce requirements to the degree necessary to

promote attainment of the purpose for which they were imposed."
Despite the technical absence of explicit mandatory language, it is

no longer seriously questioned whether the debtor's name must be
stated on the financing statement, but rather, which name of the

debtor must be provided and to what extent deviations will be
tolerated.30
Differing perceptions of the objectives of Section 9-402(1) gen-

erate opposing views on the legal sufficiency of a financing statement. A financing statement protects the status of the person filing

the financing statement and provides notice to subsequent interested
parties.31 The goals of protection and notice are theoretically consistent and mutually reinforcing. But where legal sufficiency of the financing statement is at issue, the underlying conflict between the
two goals surfaces in the judicial approach to the analysis of competing claims. This is particularly evident from a comparison of the decisions analyzed from the different perspectives. From the perspec-

tive of the secured party filer, the errors in naming the debtor appear
minor, and protection of the filer assumes prominence. Analyzed
27. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) & official comment 9 (1989) (discouraging "fanatical" and
"impossibly refined" readings of statutory requirements by the courts); see also Recent Decisions, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 171, 173 (1963) (stating that courts had come to view filing as a
ritual which was to be rigidly adhered to, and had lost sight of the true purpose of filing, which
was notice). This attitude has been called "fanatical" and "impossibly refined." U.C.C. § 9402(8) official comment 9 (1989).
28. For an example of reasoning which the Code expressly rejects, see General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952). See also U.C.C. § 9402(8) comment 9 (1989).
29. Frisch, U.C.C. Filings: Changing Circumstances Can Make a Right Filing Wrong.
But Can They Make a Wrong Filing Right?, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1253 n.28 (1983).
30. Occasionally courts find the name requirement in U.C.C. § 9-402(3), the sample
form, or in the mailing address of the debtor. See, e.g., In re DG & Assocs., Inc., 9 Bankr. 94,
96 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). But see In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 283
(D. Conn. 1965) (holding that only the signature and mailing address of the debtor, and not aseparate statement of the debtor's name, were required under the 1962 Code).
31. Through filing and completing the steps specified in Sections 9-302 and 9-303 the
filing secured party may achieve perfected status and the priorities awarded in Part 3 of Article Nine. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312 (1989). The purpose of the filed financing statement is
to provide notice to subsequent interested persons. Id. § 9-402 official comment 2.
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from the perspective of the subsequent searcher, the likelihood of
actual notice is the paramount concern, and errors that interfere
with notice are seriously misleading.
The technical vagueness of the statute permits courts to choose
between these competing goals of protection and notice. Favoring
protection over notice unfairly shifts transactional burdens and burdens of proof to the subsequent searchers. Therefore, to the extent a
choice must be made, it should be in favor of notice. Optimally, consensus should be reached on an approach that unites both goals to
preserve and promote the reliability of the system.
Section 9-402 admits the possibility of using another name for
the debtor such as a trade name, fictitious name, assumed name,
common name, commonly used name, or alias.2 However, Section 9402 must presuppose the use of the legal name of the debtor 33 because the system can only operate effectively if it is based on fundamental assumptions that the name identifies the debtor, does not
change over time, is universally known, and is verifiable by reference
to a reliable official public record. Judicial validation of the use of a
name other than the debtor's legal name through application of Section 9-402(8) challenges fundamental assumptions and undermines
the reliability of the system which depends upon the use of one name
only for the debtor. 4
C. Legislative Action
The earliest version of the U.C.C. did not set forth the "name of
32. See B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2.09[l][b], at 2-73 (2d ed. 1988).
33. See also id. 2.09,[1], at 2-68 to -70. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 13, at
976 n.137 (noting that "it was the intent of the drafters [of the U.C.C.] to require the use of
the individual, corporate or partnership name."). The record of the proceedings of the drafting
of the U.C.C. did not reveal the reason for omitting a specific reference to the name of the
debtor. Karl Llewellyn did raise the potential problem as one that should be discussed, but
there is no record of any discussion nor any change to reflect the concerns he expressed. See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND Am.LAW INST.,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PROCEEDINGS IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE 55 (Sept. 1949),
reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, SEC. J,U.C.C., roll 12, at J.XI.9.d. (microfilm). Predecessor statutes similarly offered no explanation.
34. If multiple or variable names for one debtor are judicially permitted to satisfy Code
requirements, the scope of the search and the corresponding obligations are greatly expanded.
Imposing increased burdens on the searcher in effect shifts the burden of establishing the gravity of error from the secured party filer to the searcher in direct conflict with the express
language of Section 9-402(8). Section 9-402(8) requires the secured party searcher to establish
that the error is "minor" and "not seriously misleading," not that the searcher establish that
the error is "major" and "seriously misleading." See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989).
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the debtor" as a separate item of information

5

in the text of Section

9-402(1), although it was set forth in the form.3 6 The omission may
have been an oversight, or may have been implicit in the require-

ment of the mailing address of the debtor which would include the
name,3 7 or may have been instinctively identified among literate per-

sons as inherent in the signature of the debtor.3 8
The significance of the omission, of course, is that decisions governed by the 1962 Code were compelled to overcome the technical

deficiency of Section 9-402(1). Liberally construing the debtor name
requirement, courts may have been reluctant to invalidate financing

statements for failure to properly state the name of the debtor when
the statute itself did not advise creditors of the critical need to do

so." The imperative need to fill, by judicial interpretation, the void
1

35. For a description of the drafting process and early history of the Code, see Hanna,
The Uniform Commercial Code and Mississippi Law of Personal Property Security, 34 J.
NAT'L A. REF. BANKR. 117, 117-119 (1960). The 1962 Uniform Commercial Code did not
separately state that the name of the debtor must appear; it merely provided that "[a] financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party." U.C.C. § 9-402
(1962). Among literate persons, a signature corresponds to the person's proper name. The
omission of an express requirement may have been an inadvertent error in the drafting process
or an assumption that the mailing address included the debtor's name. McMillin v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975); 9 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402:9, at 453 (3d ed. 1985).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-402(3) (1989). This section provides that: "A form substantially as
follows is sufficient to comply with subsection (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor)
Address
Name of secured party (or assignee)
Address."
Id. The signature is required at the bottom, after the description of collateral and other information. Id. The portion of Section 9-402(3) relevant to this analysis has remained unchanged
through nearly forty years. Compare U.C.C. § 9-402 (Draft 1951) with U.C.C. § 9-402
(1962) and U.C.C. § 9-402 (1972) and U.C.C. § 9-402 (1989).
37. Courts held the name of the debtor to be a requirement by virtue of the form set
forth in U.C.C. § 9-402(3), which requests the name of the debtor as the first item on the
form. In re DG & Assoc., 9 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); see also Walker, Creation,
Perfection, and Enforcement of Security Interests Under the "Tennessee" Commercial Code,
48 TEN. L. Rav. 819, 824-25 (1981) (noting that although Tennessee does not specifically
require that the name of the debtor appear on the financing statement, it does require the
debtor's address to appear and a name is needed in order for the address to be sufficient).
38. See In re Vaughan, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 61, 65 (W.D. Mich. 1967)
(stating that "if a signature is clear, any indexing under a wrongful spelling [of the debtor's
name] would be the fault of the Register of Deeds"). Extrapolating the name requirement
from the signature requirement posed difficulties, however, since a signature may not necessarily state any name at all for the debtor by virtue of the Code definition. See U.C.C. § 1201(39) (1989) (defining "signed" to include "any symbol").
39. See, e.g., In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 283 (D. Conn. 1965)
(holding that the 1962 Code excused the absence of the correct name of the debtor on the
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created by legislative omission during the Code's infancy has seldom
been recognized when evaluating the true weight that should be ac-

corded to these early decisions. Their applicability to current
problems in a modern context should be seriously reconsidered and
accorded limited precedential value.
The 1972 Official Text of the Code was revised to include a
specific reference to the debtor's name, but several more years
elapsed before the respective state legislatures adopted the 1972
Code.4 ° Section 9-402(7) was also introduced in the 1972 Code to
solve the problems facing courts and counselors with respect to the
debtor's name. Section 9-402(7) provides that "[a] financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it
adds other trade names or names of partners. ' 41 This provision indirectly urges the use of the proper legal name of the debtor and eschews the use of trade names or names of individual partners.42 The
Official Comments reinforce this interpretation. 43 But Section 9grounds that the name was not required at all).
40. The 1989 Code retains the option of filing a security agreement as a financing statement in Section 9-402(1). Names may be more casually stated on a security agreement, where
the identification of the parties to one another is not usually an issue. "The statutory test for
the sufficiency of a security agreement, [as opposed to a financing statement], is only that of
reasonable identification, ... [and] does not include the prohibition of 'seriously misleading'
statements ...because a security agreement does not purport to 'lead' anyone to anything."
First State Bank v. Shirley AG Service, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1987). To avoid
defeating notice, only a security agreement which states the legal name of the debtor should be
effective as a financing statement.
41. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1989). This section also states that:
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organization its name,
identity or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seriously
misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor
even though the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer.
Id. The text of Section 9-402(7) remains unchanged since its introduction in 1972.
42. See id. § 9-402(7) official comment 7.
43. Id. Official Comment 7, unchanged since 1972, provides:
Subsection (7) undertakes to deal with some of the problems as to who is the debtor.
In the case of individuals, it contemplates filing only in the individual name, not in a
trade name. In the case of partnerships it contemplates filing in the partnership
name, not in the names of any of the partners, and not in any other trade names.
Trade names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the
secured party or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system.
However, provision is made in Section 9-403(5) for indexing in a trade name if the
secured party so desires.
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402(7) does not specifically preclude the use of trade names as a
sufficient rendition of the debtor's name, and leaves the ambiguities

of Section 9-402 unresolved.44
D.

The Two-Tier Test of Section 9-402(8)

Whatever the requisites set forth in Section 9-402(1), (3), or
(7), with respect to the debtor's name, Section 9-402(8) provides a

mechanism for redeeming defective financing statements. Section 9402(8) provides that "[a] financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it
contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."4
Section 9-402(8) establishes the foundation of the legal standard for evaluating the legal sufficiency of a financing statement.
Section 9-402(8) requires only "substantial compliance" with statutory requirements,48 in contrast to the "exact compliance" standard
demanded in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley,47 which
was decided under pre-code law. Haley invalidated a filing that
omitted the suffix "Inc." from the name of the debtor. 48 The court
44. California adopted a non-uniform amendment which required the "trade name or
style," if one was used, on the financing statement. CAL.* COM. CODE § 9402(1) (Deering
1974). In 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated a filing
for failure to include the trade name, even though the correct legal name was provided. National Cash Register Co. v. Danning (In re Thrift Shoe Co.), 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974).
The California legislature swiftly repealed the amendment in 1974 to allow, but not require,
inclusion of the trade name on the financing statement. CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (Deering
1990). Evidently, the attempt to improve discoverability of the financing statement for anyone
searching under the trade name was not worth the sacrifice of invalidating filings made in the
legal name only.
45. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989). Originally this provision appeared in the Code as § 9-

402(5) in the 1956 proposal of the U.C.C. See AMERICAN
OF COMMNISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

LAW INST. AND NAT'L CONFERENCE

1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL
300 [hereinafter 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS],

reprinted in 18 AMERICAN LAW INST. AND NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 324 (E.S. Kelly Compiler 1984)

[hereinafter

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS];

see also Uniform Commercial Code: Ar-

ticle 9 Proposals (Oct. 22, 1956), reprinted in KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, SEC. J, U.C.C., roll
20, at J.XVIII.8.c (microfilm).
46. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989). Compare Bank of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In
re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84 Bankr. 533, 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that "the name
under which the financing statement is filed must be sufficiently similar to the debtor's name
'so that a reasonably prudent subsequent creditor would be likely to discover the prior security
interest.' ") and Lieberman Music Co. v. Hagen, 394 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that a financing statement filed by a bank prior to debtor's incorporation was not
subsequently made seriously misleading) with General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329
Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952) (requiring exact compliance with U.C.C. § 9-402(8)).
47. 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952).
48. Haley, 329 Mass. at 561-65, 109 N.E.2d at 145-47. The name of the debtor, E.R.
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concluded that the debtor was not properly identified and that the
secured party failed to meet its burden of proof that the filing would
be located through a search of the record.4 9 Haley further opined
that the filing would be ineffective to perfect the security interest
even if it could be found, simply because the name was technically
incorrect by virtue of the missing "Inc."5 The decision outraged
commercial lenders.5 1 Drafted in rebellion aginst Haley, Section 9402(8) directs the courts not to use technical grounds to invalidate a
financing statement that otherwise meets the objectives of notice filing.5 2 The substantial compliance test established in Section 9402(8) for evaluating the legal sufficiency of a financing statement
should therefore be applied only to promote the purpose of providing
effective notice.
Section 9-402(8) invites a two-tier evaluation of a disputed financing statement: (1) the financing statement must substantially
comply with Section 9-402(1) requirements, and (2) any error in the
financing statement must be minor and not seriously misleading. An
evaluation of the gravity and consequence of any error in naming the
debtor should be made only if substantial compliance with the requirements has been achieved.5 3 Under the second tier, any error
must be "minor" and "not seriously misleading. ' 54 This formulation
suggests that the potential effect of the error on a subsequent person
must be considered, because "misleading" necessarily involves another person. It also implies that the burden of proving that the error
is "not seriously misleading" rests on the secured party relying on
the filing for protection. Shifting the burden to the subsequent
searcher to prove that the error is seriously misleading contradicts
the statutory mandate.
Differing views on evaluating the error and imposing the burdens have compromised Section 9-402(8) as a standard for determinMcMillen Co., Inc., was stated as "E.R. McMillen Company" on the trust receipt, the preCode equivalent of a financing statement. Id. at 563-64, 109 N.E.2d at 146.
49. Id. at 564-65, 109 N.E.2d at 146-47.
50. Id.
51. See generally 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 45, at 298-300, reprinted in
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFMS. supra note 45, at 322-24 (discussing the 1956 U.C.C.
proposed final Draft).
52. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) official comment 9 (1989) (expressly rejecting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952)).
53. See Wheels, Inc. v. Otasco, Inc. (In re Otasco, Inc.), 111 Bankr. 976, 991 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1990) (stating that the purpose of § 9-402(8) is to validate essentially complete
and correct financing statements).
54. See supra text accompanying note 45 (reproducing U.C.C. § 9-402(8)).
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ing the effectiveness of a properly filed financing statement.5 5 Interpretation is further complicated by the tautological nature of Section
9-402(8). Substantial compliance appears synonymous with errors
that are not seriously misleading. If the error is seriously misleading,
there can be no substantial compliance. If the error is minor, the
financing statement substantially complies with Code requirements.
But an error that appears to be minor may be seriously misleading
and the financing statement therefore would not substantially comply with Code requirements. Difficulties in defining the terms and
deciding whose definitions should prevail continue to perplex the
courts. Straightforward progress in interpreting this apparently circular provision may be made through implementation of this two-tier
analytical process.
E. The Need for Uniform Interpretation
Although analysis of the sufficiency of defective financing statements has almost universally involved a discussion of Section 9402(8), the standard enunciated therein has 'neither been applied nor
interpreted in a uniform manner. Conflicting interpretations threaten
the certainty of perfected status, thwart the predictability of outcomes to disputes, and increase administrative burdens.5 6 Expansive
interpretations foster confusion with respect to the legal obligations
of a secured party and subsequent searchers. Holding that a name
other than the debtor's legal name is not seriously misleading by application of Section 9-402(8) in effect retroactively expands the
scope of the search burden imposed on the subsequent searcher. Correspondingly, it diminishes a secured party's perceived need to accurately state the name of the debtor on the financing statement. Excessive tolerance of'deviations in stating the name of the debtor on
the financing statement undermines the usefulness of the U.C.C. as a
system,5 7 threatens its efficiency, 58 and contravenes basic policies of
the Code.59
55. See infra notes 56-319 and accompanying text.
56. To be certain of protection, additional filings may be made in different names of the
debtor, consuming labor, time, space and natural resources. All creditors are burdened including those who rely upon § 9-402(8) in a given dispute because in other transactions they may
themselves be the subsequent secured creditors.
57. A system depends on the use of standard information in order to operate, and to
operate successfully requires agreement on the key provisions.
58. Volume filings to cover variations serve no useful purpose for the majority of credit
transactions, which conclude without incident.
59. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1989).
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One of the underlying purposes and policies of the Act is "to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." 60 Requiring
the use of the legal name on the financing statement, either through
legislation or judicial interpretation, will advance the goal of uniformity and improve the reliability of the notice filing system21
While implementation of this policy, with its objective of facilitating
commercial transactions, seems obviously directed to the state legislatures,62 the statute clearly envisions judicial responsibilities to construe the Code consistently with its underlying purposes and policies.6 3 Courts have recognized their role in promoting uniformity by
customarily reviewing opinions without regard to traditional jurisdictional boundaries. 4 The adoption of a consistent method of analysis
should resolve many interpretive difficulties. However, completely
uniform interpretations are not likely among the jurisdictions as long
as underlying administrative systems of each state are different.6"
60. Id. § 1-102(2)(c). Even the title of the Uniform Commercial Code proclaims its
aspirations for uniformity and concludes with a proclamation of its intention "to make uniform
the law" with respect to the subject matter it covers. Id. The other purposes are "(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; [and] (b) to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties." Id. § 1-102(2).
61. See Note, Trade Name Filing: Should It Be Sufficient to Perfect a Security Interest
Under U.C.C. Section 9-402?, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 51, 57, 66-67 (1984) (authored by
Lawrence Bach) (advocating a per se rule for use of the legal name, but allowing for the
approach taken in In re McBee). In National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re
McBee), 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit held that even though the security
interest was filed in the sole proprietor's trade name, it was properly perfected. The per se
approach invalidates the financing statement for omission of the debtor's legal name. Note,
supra, at 57.
62. The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted for enactment by each state's legislature. For a discussion of the difficulties in maintaining uniformity of the Code when amendments are made, see Kripke, Mr. Levenberg's Criticism of the Final Report of the Article 9
Review Committee: A Reply, 56 MINN. L. REv. 805, 806-08 (1972).
63. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1989) (stating that "[t]his Act shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."). The Official Comments thereto
advise courts that "proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason." Id. official comment 1.
64. Such boundaries have occasionally been invoked to discharge an unwanted result.
See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga. 1979) (noting that although the
Uniform Commercial Code was enacted "to establish standard business laws throughout the
United States" and although Georgia courts should apply the Code in uniformity with other
jurisdictions, "such reasoning when carried to the extreme would result in Georgia being consistently wrong simply for the sake of consistency, an obviously intolerable result. Georgia
should not follow bad Code precedent from other jurisdictions."), affd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.
1979).
65. The systems for processing and retrieving financing statements vary significantly.
They include manual operations, word processing of the information onto microfilm or into the
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Nonetheless, if judicial consensus can be reached on the respective

obligations of the parties and on the relevant factors to be considered
and routinely applied, the predictability of outcome will yield a mea-

sure of certainty that can facilitate transactions and settlement of
disputes without unnecessary litigation. A consistent judicial approach, such as the adoption of the two-tier analysis of Section 9-

402, would advance the goal of uniformity and improve the reliability of the notice filing system.
II.

OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES

To a large extent, courts agree in theory that a financing state-

ment filed in the name of the debtor should be discoverable by a
searcher. The traditional judicial formulation of the Section 9402(8) standard parallels the statutory language. A financing statement must substantially comply with requirements, and a financing
statement that "contains minor errors that are not seriously misleading" is sufficient to perfect the security interest of the secured party
filer.6 6 This universal restatement of the principle cloaks a multitude

of complex and interlocking variables. Almost as numerous as the
cases in controversy, judicial approaches can, however, be grouped

into three broad categories.
The first category holds that the use of the legal name of the

debtor is always appropriate and legally sufficient. The legal name
substantially complies with Code requirements, 7 whether or not
trade names appear on the financing statement,6 8 and irrespective of
memories of various types of computers, or image processing whereby sophisticated equipment
visually scans the financing statement and reads relevant information into data banks. The
procedures may also differ. For example, different files may be maintained for business debtors
and for personal debtors, or different protocols may be followed with respect to alphabetizing
the financing statements. See J. Zekan, supra note 17. A name that is similar to the debtor's
legal name may be discovered by "thumbing through the files" in a manual system in which
personal and business files are integrated, but may not be discovered if the files are separated
or if the office is computerized. Id. A court that interprets Section 9-402(8) on the assumption
of a manual system may conclude that an error is minor and not seriously misleading, whereas
a court that interprets Section 9-402(8) to require evaluation of the financing statement in the
context of a computerized system and actual notice may conclude otherwise with respect to the
same debtor name error.
66. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989).
67. See First Manufactured Hous. Credit Corp. v. Clarkson Mobile Home Park, Inc.,
148 A.D.2d 901, 539 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1989) (holding that the legal name is required and substantially complies with the statute provided it is properly presented in traditional form: first
name, middle initial, last name; a form which was not present in this case).
68. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) official comment 7 (1989) (stating that "[t]rade names are
deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the secured party or person
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any error that may appear in the trade name. The second category
consists of a few, highly influential opinions that hold that the requirement for the "name" of the debtor under Section 9-402(1)
may, under special circumstances, be satisfied by the use of the
debtor's trade name. 9 Such use does not constitute any error at all
under Section 9-402(8) no matter how different the trade name 0
appears to be from the legal name.7 1 In both the first and second
categories, the decisions turn on the first tier of the analysis: the substantial compliance component of the legal sufficiency standard.
The third category generally acknowledges that deviations from
the debtor's legal name constitute error, but the defects are not necessarily fatal. In the struggle to define contours of acceptable deviation these courts apply modified forms of the "sufficiently related" or
"substantial similarity" test first articulated in In re Platt 2 to compare the defective name against the debtor's legal name. However,
some courts place more emphasis on the notice function of the financing statement and on realities of the filing system than on apparent name similarity. a Two basic analytical frameworks reflecting
these divergent approaches have emerged in the third category. Legal sufficiency of a financing statement is viewed either from the perspective of the secured party who prepares and files the financing
statement, or from the perspective of the potential creditor who subsequently searches the public record. 4 In both, the second tier of the
searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system."); Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v.
Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that financing statements filed
by a creditor which stated only the debtor's trade name and not the debtor's correct name
were not in substantial compliance with the statute and were fatally defective).
69. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B
Apr. 1981); see also In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that the filing of a financing statement in debtor's trade name rather than the legal name
of the corporation is not per se improper under Georgia law), affd sub nom. Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990). Contra Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc.,
831 F.2d 1531 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a security interest was unperfected where the
filing was made under debtor's trade name rather than its legal name).
70. For a description of a trade name and an example, see supra note 16.
71. The first major case to articulate this view was Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re
Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981), discussed at infra notes 117-34 and
accompanying text.
72. 257 F. Supp. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1966). For a discussion of Platt, see infra notes
204-16 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Bank of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84
Bankr. 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that since financing statements are indexed according to the debtor's name, "the name under which a filing is made must be ... [one] 'that
a reasonably prudent subsequent creditor would be likely to discover.' ").
74. Compare In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that a
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Section 9-402(8) analysis figures prominently, but with different emphasis. An analysis from the preparer's perspective tends to mini-

mize the magnitude of the error, whereas an analysis from the
searcher's perspective tends to concentrate on the seriously mislead-

ing consequences of the error. This latter, functional approach is
consistent with the liberal treatment of most of the requirements of

§ 9-402(1),11 but it does demand a generally strict reading with respect to the key feature - the name of the debtor - so that the
filing will not be seriously misleading to a subsequent searcher.
There is no unified approach in this third category, which copes
with interpreting Section 9-402(8) through diverse assessments of a
variety of factors. Apart from the varying perspectives of review,
courts have differed in their perceptions of relevant facts and alloca-

tion of legal burdens. 76 Some courts have rejected consideration of
security agreement which would have permitted any interested person searching the record to
be put on notice that there was an outstanding lien and that communication with the officer
who signed it may be appropriate was a "minor error" which was not "seriously misleading")
and Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1972)
(holding that a subsequent creditor searching under the debtor's legal name would not find the
security interest which was filed and indexed under the debtor's trade name) with DietrichPost Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank of the North (In re McCauley's Reprographics, Inc.), 638 F.2d
117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that while the usual approach is to make a factual inquiry into
the extent to which an error in the financing statement would be misleading to one undertaking a reasonable search, due to the peculiar circumstances in this case, i.e., the name of the
debtor listed erroneously as a partnership rather than a corporation, the court must determine
whether the financing statement was seriously misleading).
75. The adequacy of collateral descriptions tends to be liberally construed. See Dick
Hatfield Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bob Watson Motors, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 350, 699 P.2d 566
(holding that a security agreement which described a vehicle used as collateral as having an
extra digit at the end of its vehicle identification number did not render the security interest
invalid), rev'd on other grounds, 238 Kan. 41, 708 P.2d 494 (1985). Some courts have narrowly and strictly construed § 9-402 requirements even for description of collateral. See, e.g.,
In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d 1133, 1136 (3d Cir. 1974) (requiring that a
financing statement provide "a clear designation of any class of items intended to be collateral."); Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)
(stating that the "description must ... identify the collateral so that it can be distinguished
and separated from property not covered"; it should not be incomplete nor vague). But see
John Deere Co. v. Butler County Implement, Inc., 232 Kan. 273, 655 P.2d 124 (1982) (holding that misclassification of goods as "inventory" rather than as "equipment" did not render
security interest claim invalid). The name requirements have been liberally construed in
Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981)
and in In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), affd sub nom.
Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990). But see Covey v. Hollis Eng'g,
Inc. (In re Covey), 66 Bankr. 459 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (strictly construing the U.C.C. name
requirements); Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785 (2d
Cir. 1972); In re Causer's Town & Country Super Market, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 541 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1965) (same).
76. Cf. Kay Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. McGovern Auto Specialty, Inc. (In re Mc-
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administrative procedures and policies while other courts have found
them outcome determinative.77 Results may differ depending upon
whether the type of system in operation is manual or electronic;
these facts should be considered in reviewing opinions across jurisdictional boundaries. Advanced technological filing and search systems do impact on the commercial realities of the situation, and judicial interpretation of 9-402(8) should be flexible enough to
accommodate these innovations.7 8 Opinions differ on whether the
transactional burdens with respect to a filed financing statement
should rest more heavily on the preparer to prepare a more accurate
financing statement or on the searcher to expand the scope of the
search. The analysis should focus, however, not only on the respective burdens between the disputing claimants but even more so on
the effect of burden allocation on the system as a whole.
Because of the complexity of issues, cases do not comfortably fit
within specific categories. Cases have also been analyzed in the
courts by reference to the type of error: misspellings, partial rendition of the debtor's actual name, omission of corporate suffixes, or
the use of the trade name instead of the true name. 9 The name used
may not be the perfectly correct form of the name; for example, a
hyphen might be present or absent, the word "company" might be
present, absent or abbreviated, or a vital name might be abbreviated
when it should have been spelled out in full. 80 Error classification,
Govern Auto Specialty, Inc.), 51 Bankr. 511 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (placing the burden of
proving the sufficiency of the financing statement on the person who is relying on the financing

statement for perfection - the secured party filer).
77. Compare Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988) (disregarding consideration of administrative procedures) with In re
Waters, 90 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (finding administrative procedures to be
outcome determinitive).
78. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1989) (identifying the continued expansion of commercial practices as an underlying purpose of the Code); see also id. official comment 1. Electronic
technology makes more direct access possible. For example, as of the publication of this Article, financing statement "UCC-1" searches may be conducted on Lexis for the following
states: California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Texas. See LEXIS,
Liens library.
79. See McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 972-93. For purposes of analysis, Professor McLaughlin grouped hidden security interests into six general categories: different name; changeof-use; change-of-place; misindexed; semi-hidden; and second-in-time, first-in-right security interests. Id.
80. A discrepancy in the secured party's name would not necessarily impair notice because the discoverability of the financing statement is not jeopardized by such an error. Simplot v. Williams C. Owens, M.D., P.A., No. 17859, slip op. at 3 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 3, 1990);

see also U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989) (stating that a financing statement can remain effective
even though containing minor errors).
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however, leads to fact specific decisions that only invite subjectivity
and virtually preclude objective application of the standard for legal
sufficiency of a financing statement. While investigation of the type
of error may be very instructive with respect to formulating computer programs to minimize the effect of the error, analysis through
error classification does not significantly advance the development of
a consistent standard that may be applied regardless of the type of
error involved.
The lack of consensus on these issues contributes significantly to
the proliferation of interpretations of Section 9-402 provisions. The
courts are in general agreement that the dispositive question to determine a financing statement's legal sufficiency with respect to the
debtor's name is "whether a

. . .search under the debtor's

...

name would uncover the filing."81 Courts do not agree on.what name
must be used, what constitutes the scope of a legally sufficient
search, what facts must be considered, who bears the transactional
burdens, the search burdens, and burdens of proof; and courts do not
agree on whether the errant financing statement should be compared
to the correct form only or reviewed within the context of the actual
filing system. The perspective from which the court reviews these
issues plays a significant role in the analysis.
A.

The First Category: The First Tier Test of Substantial
Compliance
A challenge to the use of the debtor's legal name on the financing statement evokes a straightforward application of Section 9-402.
The "name" in Section 9-402(1) is construed to mean the "legal
name" of the debtor; its use "substantially complies" with requirements under the first tier of the § 9-402(8) test and there is no error
82
to evaluate under the "seriously misleading" test of the second tier.

81.

In re Davadick, 82 Bankr. 391, 393 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988); see also Dietrich-Post

Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank of the North (In re McCauley's Reprographics, Inc.), 638 F.2d 117,

119 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[w]hen the name of the debtor has been erroneously listed
on the financing statement, the dispositive question is usually whether or not a reasonable
search under the debtor's true name would uncover the filing."); In re Hinson & Hinson, Inc.,
62 Bankr. 964, 966 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting the rule from McCauley's
Reprographics). But see Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th

Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (not confining the name requirement or the search to the legal name of
the debtor); National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d

1316 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
82. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (explaining the two-tier evaluation
test of U.C.C. § 9-402(8)).
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1. The Debtor's Legal Name.-In In re Penn Housing
Corp.,8 3 the earlier secured party filed in the debtor's legal name.
The challenger argued that the financing statement did not substantially comply with requirements and that the financing statement
was legally insufficient because it contained the debtor's true name
instead of the debtor's trade name. The challenger, the later
purchase money secured party, filed in the debtor's trade name but
failed to give actual written notice to the earlier secured party of its
purchase money interest. 4 The purchase money holder claimed it
was excused from giving notice because the earlier creditor had used
the debtor's true name and not the commonly known trade name
that the debtor used in its transactions with its suppliers. The court
struck down the challenge and held that the earlier secured party's
filing in the true name perfected its interest and provided sufficient
notice of the earlier creditor's interest. Priority was denied to the
purchase money secured party. The court construed "name" in Section 9-402(1) to clearly encompass "the legal name" of the debtor
and held that use of the legal name substantially complies with the §
9-402(1) requirement.8"
The use of the debtor's legal name on the financing statement
has not yet been held against the secured party filing such statement.88 Where the debtor's legal name was properly stated on the
financing statement, attempts to invalidate financing statements due
to errors in the trade names have consistently been rebuffed. In one
of the earliest cases, the court held that misstating the trade name as
83. 367 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
84. Id. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1989) awards priority to the first secured party to perfect its
security interest. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) reverses the general rules of priority stated in § 9-312(5)
and enables a purchase money secured party in inventory, who perfects later in time, to take
priority over an earlier perfected party if it satisfies special requirements, including the giving
of actual written notice to prior parties of record concerning its intended purchase money
interest in the inventory of the debtor.
85. Abbreviations of the legal name may also suffice, at least where the indexing system
produces the filing in response to a request in the legal name. In re Southern Supply Co. of
Greenville, N.C., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 20, 23 (1975); see also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Wedel, 489
N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Ind. App. 1986) (holding that the elimination of the article "The" in the
corporate name "The Post, Inc." was a minor error and not seriously misleading, and that the
test of legal sufficiency is a question of law, not of fact).
86. See In re Farm & Home Supply Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1081, 1086
(W.D. Pa. 1977) (stating that "[w]e have been unable to find any [cases] in which a filing in
the debtor's real name is insufficient"). Farm & Home Supply sustained the validity of the
secured party's filing in the legal name of the corporation over the challenger's claim that the
filing should have been made in the debtor's trade name, which had been the name of the
partnership prior to incorporation. Id.
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"Cozy Kitchen" instead of "Kozy Kitchen" was at most a minor

error which was not seriously misleading because the debtor's name
Edmund Carroll vas properly provided and the financing statement

would have been correctly indexed under "Carroll. ' 87 If the financing statement is filed under the debtor's legal name, the original financing statement continues to be effective even if the trade name

listed on a financing statement changes completely into a different
trade name.88
2. Errors in Stating the Debtor's Legal Name.-The use of
the legal name is not without its difficulties, however, even if no
trade name is involved. In Central National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Bank & Trust Co.,80 the debtor James Lee Anderson
obtained four loans from three different financial institutions using
the same automobile as collateral.9 ° The debtor obtained a loan from
the first bank under the name "Lee Anderson," and another loan

from a second bank under the name "James L. Anderson." 91 To determine whether the error was "seriously misleading" under Section
9-402(8) the court applied common law estoppel to place the loss
upon the one who by his conduct created the circumstances which
enabled the debtor to perpetrate the wrong or cause the loss.9 2 Be-

cause the first bank did not take steps to protect against the wrongs
perpetrated by the debtor and failed to use the proper legal name of

the debtor, the first bank's interest was held inferior to that of the
87. National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 259, 191 N.E.2d
471, 474 (1963) (stating that the trade name was "merely part of the name and style under
which the debtor, an individual, did business"). For an in depth discussion of National Cash
Register, which was a case of first impression under the Massachusetts U.C.C. interpreting the
legal sufficiency of description of collateral with respect to after acquired property, see Case
Note, 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 172 (1963-64).
88. This phrase, "True name filings in a D/B/A case," was borrowed from Drysdale v.
Cornerstone Bank, 562 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Mo. App. 1978) who coined it as the "jargon of
commercial lawyers." Id.; see also Hemminger v. Allied Farm Equip. (In re Hemminger), 20
Bankr. 357 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that under § 9-402(7) a seriously misleading
change in the name of the debtor necessitates a new filing only if the true name, not the trade
name, changes); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (ruling that the filing against debtor Lloyd E. Nations continued to be
effective even after the sole proprietor changed its trade name from Nations' David Brown
Tractor Company to Nations' Tractor Company).
89. 528 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1974).
90. Id. at 713.
91. Id. at 712. The filing and retrieval systems treated the names as belonging to two
different people. See id.
92. Id. at 713. The court called this principle the "two innocent persons" principle, or
the "doctrine of estoppel by negligence," and regarded both the filer and the searcher as innocent parties. Id.
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second bank.9 3 The Court impliedly reviewed the sufficiency of the
financing statement from the perspective of the searcher and concluded that reasonable diligence would not require'the second bank
"to examine all the secured transaction[s] index[ed] under the name
'Anderson.' 94 The scope of the search was limited to the proper
legal name of the debtor, and the use of "Lee Anderson" instead of
"James L. Anderson" was seriously misleading. 9 Under Anderson,
the proper legal name of the debtor consists of a first name and last
name, and the proper legal name is not only legally sufficient; it is
legally necessary. 6
In re Arnold was "just another in a long line of cases dealing
with the'debtor's name. ' 97 Filing under the name "Jack Arnold"
was held not to perfect a security interest under "Herschel J. Arnold" because the names were perceived as identifying two different
persons, and a search for one name would not lead to discovery of
filings for the other's name. 98 Since it was not the policy to look at
signatures, the fact that the Jack Arnold financing statement was
signed "Herschel J. Arnold" was irrelevant.9 9 Cases that declined to
review the signature for clarification of the debtor's name signified a
departure from the lenient interpretation prevalent during the Code's
infancy. Those cases that resorted to the comparison of the name
with the signature presumed that the financing statement would be
discovered in the first place. Such presumptions of discovery are no
longer valid due to the sheer volume of filings. Moreover, advanced
technology virtually precludes such immediate comparison. Greater
accuracy and stricter construction is required. The legal name must
be used, and it must be stated in the first line of the form, not in the
signature.
Recently, the courts reinforced this concept of the proper legal
name in First ManufacturedHousing Credit Corp. v. Clarkson Mobile Home Park, Inc.100 The subsequent secured party, who had used
the debtor's full legal name, prevailed over the earlier creditor whose
93.
94.

Id.
Id.

95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Burnett v. J.I. Case Credit Corp. (In re Arnold), 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1479, 1481 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
98. Id. at 1484.
99. See id. at 1480 (relying upon the testimony of the filing registrar to determine the
likelihood of discovery of the financing statement as filed).
100. 148 A.D.2d 901, 539 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1989).
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financing statement only partially stated the name. The challenged
financing statement referred to the debtor by her middle and last
name, "Gail Keaton," and was signed "Charline Gail Keaton," the
debtor's usual signature. To determine whether the earlier creditor's
error was seriously misleading, the court queried whether a reasonably diligent searcher would be likely to discover the financing statement when searching for the debtor's correct name. The court measured the extent of the discrepancy between the true name and the
name listed in the context of the filing system."0 ' Since the listings
were alphabetical, the use of the incorrect first name "Gail" on the
financing statement would have prevented discovery of the financing
statement in question, absent an examination of all of the financing
statements on record under the last name "Keaton." The coftrt held
that such an examination would impose unreasonable burdens on the
searcher. The scope of the search was limited to the proper legal
name of the debtor. Failure to state the first name of the debtor in
the earlier creditor's financing statement constituted a major and seriously misleading error and the financing statement was therefore
not "saved" by § 9-402(8).
By contrast, the defendant's error in describing the debtor on
the financing statement as "Charlene Keaton,' 0 2 instead of "Charline Keaton," was held to be minor because the error in the first
name did not interfere with the discovery of the financing statement
in the context of the system. 03 "Charlene" and "Charline" would be
recognizable as referring to the same person. As in Central National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Bank & Trust Co. 14 and In re
Arnold, 05 Clarkson regards the legal name as the first and last
101. Id. at 902, 539 N.Y.S. 2d at 531 (citing T.M.B.B. Funding Corp. v. Associated
Food Stores, 136 A.D.2d 540, 542-43, 523 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (1988) for reasonable diligence,
and articulating the extent of discrepancy test).
102. See also Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Kurland Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 806,
293 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 32 A.D.2d 643, 300 N.Y.S.2d
884 (1969) (holding that "Shelia" was not seriously misleading for "Sheila").
103. By contrast, even if only one letter is incorrectly stated in the debtor's last name,
the error is seriously misleading because the possibilities for searching are limitless. John
Deere Co. v. William C. Pahl Constr. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 872, 300 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (holding "Ranelli" to be a seriously misleading error for the name Ranalli"), affd, 34
A.D.2d 85, 310 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1970). Where the debtor's name was Boisclair Corporation, the
insertion of a blank space rendering the debtor's'name on the financing statement as Bois Clair
Corporation was the equivalent of a misspelling and constituted fatal error. Chemical Bank v.
Title Services, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1989) (reaffirming the rule that a searcher
has no duty to anticipate spelling errors of the secured party).
104. 528 P.2d 710 (Okla. 1974).
105. Burnett v. J.I. Case Credit Corp. (In re Arnold), 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
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name of a debtor, at least where that name is uniformly used to sign
documents.10 6
3. Intentional Errors, Omissions, and Common Names.-At
least one court has stated in no uncertain terms its refusal to tolerate
intentionally misleading information on a financing statement. In In
re Parks, which involved the removal of collateral from California to
Ohio, the financing statement was falsified to show, among other
things, an erroneous date which was put on the financing statement
even though no date was required. 07 The falsifications were an "attempt to impeach, desecrate, tamper with and profane a public record, and . . . are major errors and as such are neither excused nor
forgiven [by Section 9-402(8)]."108 Presumably, if bad faith could be

shown on the part of a secured party who intentionally erred in naming the debtor, this court, and perhaps others, would find the error
per se major and seriously misleading.
By contrast, intentional deviations from accuracy were not regarded as "errors" at all in Wheels, Inc. v. Otasco, Inc. (In re
Otasco, Inc.) 0 9 and, therefore, did not qualify for the savings provision of § 9-402(8) and were not excused. Even if they were errors,
they would be major and would prevent perfected status." 0
The omission of a debtor's legal name is a fatal defect."' In
rejecting trade name substitution for the debtor's legal name, the
Ninth Circuit explained, in Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough
(In re Thomas)," 2 that "[i]f the debtor's name is not given, the pur1479 (W.D. Mich 1977).
106. First Manufactured Hous. Credit Corp. v. Clarkson Mobile Home Park, Inc., 148
A.D.2d 901, 902, 539 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (1989).
107. In re Parks, 16 Ohio Misc. 135, 140-41 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
108. Id. at 445 (Emsley, Ref., order on rehearing) (construing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1309.39(e) (Baldwin 1967)).
109. 111 Bankr. 976, 992 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (stating that "the certificates of

title misname[d] the secured party as the 'owner,' [did] not contain the real owner's name or
address at all, and [did] not disclose the existence, let alone the date, of any security agree-

ment. These misstatements and omissions [were] not inadvertent but [were] deliberate and
intentional, committed in furtherance of a scheme to misrepresent the true nature of the
transaction.").
110. Id.
111. Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir.
1972). Such errors in the secured party's name are not necessarily fatal because they may not
result in a failure of notice to subsequent searchers. See Unsecured Creditors Comm. v.
Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430 (4th Cir. 1990). But see Id. at
1435 n.6 (cautioning that "secured parties should use their legal names rather than trade

names in order to prevent any possible confusion and subsequent litigation.").
112.

466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972).
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pose of the statutory scheme of requiring [the] security interest to be

perfected by filing a financing statement creditors of the debtor -

to give notice to future

would be seriously undermined."1 1

A financing statement in the debtor's true name is legally sufficient even if the debtor is generally known in the community by another name.11 4 For example, in United States v. Smith," 5 the fact

that the debtor was known in the community as "Malcolm Hurt"
could not be used to defeat the perfected status of the secured party

who had filed its financing statement in the debtor's legal name,
"James M. Hurt." An argument that the commonly known name
should be used instead of the legal name "undermines the notice filing scheme contemplated by the U.C.C. and . . . it must be rejected.""' 6 Use of the legal name of the debtor has always been sus-

tained. From the foregoing cases and the minimal litigation over the
sufficiency of the legal name, one is hard pressed to justify the use of

any name other than the true legal name of the debtor.
B.

The Second Category: The First Tier Test and the Glasco
Approach
The foregoing analysis of sister courts notwithstanding, Brush-

wood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.)" 7 held that the use of the
debtor's trade name instead of the legal name substantially complied

with Section 9-402(1) requirements. The Glasco decision is remarkable because it parted from the usual cases which allowed trade
113. Id. at 52; accord New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Hempstead
Bank (In re Pasco Sales Co.), 52 A.D.2d 138, 383 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1976). Contra Brushwood v.
Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (finding that the
use of the trade name "Elite Boats, division of Glasco, Inc." perfected the security interest, as,
in the court's view, it sufficiently put future creditors on notice). The financing statement in
Pasco Sales for an entity representing itself as "Pacific Supply Co., division of P.S.C. Products
Corp." was filed by the Register of the county, in literal compliance with the statute, only as
the name appeared, and was not cross-indexed against the corporate name. Pasco Sales, 52
A.D.2d at 140, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 43. The trade name filing did not comply with the Code
requirements, and the defect was fatal to the secured party's claim of perfection. Id. at 143,
383 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
114. United States v. Smith, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 502, 508 (N.D. Miss
1977).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 508.
117. 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981). Glasco has been the subject of extensive
commentary. See, e.g., DeKoven, Annual Survey of the Uniform Commercial Code: Secured
Transactions, 37 Bus. LAW. 1011, 1033-34 (1982) (discussing how Glasco leads away from
uniform practice in this area of the law); Del Duca & Del Duca, Judicial Highlights, 15
U.C.C. LJ. 84, 88 (1982) (discussing whether a reasonable search under the debtor's true
name would uncover a filing).
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names if they closely resembled the legal name. 1 8 In Glasco, the
disputed financing statement stated the debtor's trade name as
"Elite Boats, Division of Glasco, Inc." instead of the legal name,
"Glasco, Inc."""9 Application of the traditional name similarity approach would disqualify the financing statement as legally insufficient because "Elite Boats" is not similar to "Glasco," and the lack
of similarity from an alphabetical perspective would render the ergor
seriously misleading. 2 0 The Glasco Court, however, applied a different approach that bypassed the name similarity test.
The trade name effectively qualified as the "name," and substantially complied with § 9-402(1) requirements under the first tier
of the Section 9-402(8) test if it satisfied the Glasco criteria of notoriety, consistency, exclusivity, and business use. 2 ' Alternatively, if it
was error to use a surrogate name, such error was only minor and
not seriously misleading under the second tier of the § 9-402(8) test
because a reasonably prudent searcher would conduct a search in the
trade name as it was the only name the debtor used. 22 As such, the
trade name filing would be discovered even in the absence of any
similarity to the debtor's legal name and would provide notice of the
security interest described in the financing statement. The Glasco
Court agreed with the filer's contention that since the debtor's name
"Elite Boats" was well known, consistently applied, and was the only
name used by the corporate debtor, the use of such trade name on
the financing statement was sufficient to perfect the security interest
in the debtor's collateral. The court agreed in part because the
debtor was a business, not an individual, and the loan was for business purposes.
Glasco distinguished between an individual debtor 2 3 using a
118. See the discussion of In re Platt at infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
119. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 795. The secured party floor planned the debtor's inventory of
marine engines for the debtor, who was a manufacturer and seller of boats in Florida. Id. The
promissory notes, security agreement, and financing statement were all executed in the
debtor's trade name, and the financing statement was so indexed. Id.
120. At the time of the Glasco filing, no separate fees were charged for cross-indexing,
and there appeared to be no fixed policy on cross indexing, See Self, supra note 19, at 120, 121
& n.54. But since 1981, Florida's forms were revised to provide sufficient space to separately
index names, and each separate name is cross indexed with a separate fee charged. See id.
121. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796. But see Bank of Mississippi v. Pongetti (In re Hill), 363
F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (rejecting the trade name even though it satisfied those
tests).
122. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
123. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1989) defines "debtor" as "[t]hc person who owes payment
or other performance of the obligation secured."
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trade name, and an artificial person 124 using a trade name, on the
theory that the trade name of an individual was the equivalent of a
second entity, and would be seriously misleading.125 Under this theory, one entity, the individual, engages in personal transactions unrelated to business activities such as buying food, paying rent, and contracting various debts in the individual's own name. The other entity,
the trade name, is an extension of the person for business purposes
and may be unknown to persons who engage in personal transactions
with the individual. The individual's business debts are contracted in
the individual's own name, even if a trade name is used, and the
individual is personally responsible for the "business" debts. But because personal creditors may not know of security interests filed
under a name different from the individual's name, the trade name
acts as a separate entity, and is or can be misleading. 26 Therefore,
under this "two entity" theory, the use of only a trade name on a
financing statement to represent an individual debtor is ineffective to
perfect a security interest.' 2 7 However, since the debtor in Glasco
was a corporation, all prudent creditors would be expected to look
for a business name and not be misled by the use of a trade name
instead of the debtor's legal name. 28
The Glasco analysis is superficially appealing. The reasons for
the secured party's use of the trade name on the financing statement
124. U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (1989) includes "an individual or an organization" in the definition of "person." An "Organization" includes "a corporation, government, . . . partnership,
. . . two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial
entity." Id. § 1-201(28).
125. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. Unit
B. Apr. 1981); see also Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce (Henry House Packing, Co.),
509 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that an individual debtor carries on personal
transactions apart from his business while an artificial entity does not); Northern Commercial
Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785, 787 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a filing in
the trade name of an individual debtor rather than in the debtor's legal name was insufficient
even though the debtor conducted his business under the trade name).
126. For a variation on this theory, see National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply
Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a filing of a security interest
in the sole proprietor's trade name was sufficient where the trade name was consistently and
obstensibly used to refer to the business).
127. See Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796; see also Hobart Corp. v. North Cent. Credit Serv.,
Inc., 29 Wash. App. 302, 628 P.2d 842 (1981) (holding that a financing statement that listed
the trade name "Country Market" instead of the individual's name "Dean Nielson," was seriously misleading). But see McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321-25 (holding that the filing made under
the trade name only was not seriously misleading even though the debtor was an individual
because "any reasonably diligent searcher would probably have been more likely to discover
this filing than one in either individual's name.").
128. Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796.
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appear justified, or at least reasonably understandable. The function
of notice appears to be served. Glasco, however, marks an enormous
departure from a traditional approach to the issues of legal sufficiency and errs in its fundamental assumptions.
By definition, a trade name cannot be the only name used because of the parallel existence of a true legal name of the person
responsible for the debt. 129 Requiring a search in the trade name
presupposes the very knowledge that the searcher lacks because a
trade name exclusively used at the time of filing may no longer be
exclusive or even in existence at the time of search. 30° Even if Glasco
infers exclusivity at both points and at all times during the life of the
financing statement, a searcher cannot be sure that such use was
exclusive and may not even be aware of its use. The obligation to
search the trade name unfairly burdens the searcher and the filing
system. Further, the searcher is unfairly burdened because the obligation to search in the trade name is imposed retrospectively, by a
court that subsequently determines what the search obligations
should have been. 131 At the time a particular search must be made, a
particular searcher may be operating under the assumption that he
has complied with the general rule which limits the scope of a reasonable routine search to the debtor's legal name. 132 Such a searcher,
who has relied upon the results of a search conducted in the debtor's
legal name, may be unfairly surprised by a court's subsequent imposition of an expanded obligation in his particular case.' 33 If searchers
129. In Glasco, the debtor was a corporation. Id. at 795. The Articles of Incorporation,
By-Laws and Corporate Resolutions must bear the corporate name. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 118, at 272-75, § 133,
at 306-10 (3d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1986). The corporate name is used in correspondence with the
Secretary of State regarding payment of annual dues to remain in good standing. Any law
suits pending against the debtor must be brought in the debtor's corporate name. Id. § 352, at
1020.
130. Conversely, a trade name exclusively used at the time of a search may not have
been so used at the time of filing. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) official comment 7 (1989) rejects trade
names as "too uncertain and too likely not to be known to the secured party or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system." However, U.C.C. § 9-403(5) (1989)
provides for indexing in a trade name if the secured party so desires.
131. See, e.g., Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.
Unit B. Apr. 1981); National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714
F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983); Pongetti v. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94
Bankr. 898 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988).
132. The general rule limiting the scope of the search to the debtor's legal name was
applied in Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.
1972).
133. See, e.g., Glasco, 642 F.2d at 795; McBee, 714 F.2d at 1319. But see Note, supra
note 61, at 68-69. The author suggested that Glasco used a notice analysis because Glasco
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become aware of the potential risks of post hoc review, they may

begin to routinely conduct searches in the debtor's trade name. In
effect Glasco imposes on every searcher the burden of discovering

the debtor's trade name and conducting a search in the trade name
of the debtor, as well as in the legal name.
This burden is all the more unfair because there is no reliable
way for a searcher to discover what trade name or names the debtor
uses. 134 The efficiency of an entire system should not be jeopardized

for the sake of justifying a filer's use of a trade name. All searchers
will be unfairly burdened. Moreover, the multitude of search requests will add to everyone's costs, unduly burden the operation of
the system and produce only marginal benefits.
1. Expansion of the Glasco Approach.-Although the Glasco
decision has generated substantial criticism,3 5 it has been followed
in the Fifth Circuit'36 and in the Eleventh Circuit. 37 National Bank
v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee) 38 expanded the
Glasco analysis and suggested that a trade name filing might actu-

ally provide better notice of a prior security interest than a legal
imposed the condition that the creditors know the debtor's trade name. Id. at 58-59. However,
notice that presumes knowledge essentially begs the question of notice.
134. Even a searcher who is aware of the debtor's trade name is not expected to search
for such name because of its inherent unreliability, the language of U.C.C. § 9-402(7) and
views expressed in the Official Comments thereto, and usual commercial practice. There is no
reliable way to discover what trade name the debtor uses. Fictitious name registration statutes
only provide a mechanism for discovering the true name of the debtor if the trade name is
already known; there is no mechanism for discovering the trade name if only the true name is
known. Moreover, not all jurisdictions have assumed, trade, or fictitious name registration statutes. See Weise, U.C.C. Article 9 - Personal Property Secured Transactions, 45 Bus. LAW.
2475 (1990) (criticizing a rule which would require a subsequent creditor to search for even a
widely-used ficticious name registration).
135. One author succinctly expressed his view of the secured party filer's responsibility
to state the debtor's name properly on the financing statement: "Is it asking too much of
secured parties, in order to preserve their security interests, to get one thing right?" Note,
supra note 61, at 71.
136. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316
(5th Cir. 1983).
137. Glasco, a Fifth Circuit case decided April 15, 1981, became binding as precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit under Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (1 lth Cir.
1981) (rendering decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to Sept. 30, 1981 binding as precedent for the Eleventh Circuit). The Fifth Circuit was divided into two courts, the Eleventh and
the "new fifth" on Oct. 1, 1981 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1995. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207. A subsequent case
within the jurisdiction of the Eleventh Circuit, In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 Bankr. 813
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), affd sub nom. Willson v. Habersham Bank, I 11 Bankr. 368 (N.D.
Ga. 1990), also relied upon the Glasco analysis. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying
text.
138. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
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name filing. Moreover, McBee applied Glasco to validate the use of
a trade name for an individual debtor, a view that Glasco expressly
rejected.
McBee involved three creditors, two debtors, and a transfer of
ownership of the collateral. 39 In January 1979, Cynthia K. McBee
obtained a loan from National Bank of Texas on behalf of Joe Ben
Colley which was collateralized by equipment and inventory of the
business he operated under the trade name "Oak Hill Gun Shop."140
The financing statement listed the debtor as "Oak Hill Gun Shop"
and was signed by McBee as "partner." '4 1 National Bank perfected
1 42
by filing a financing statement against "Oak Hill Gun Shop.
West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. subsequently extended goods on
credit and filed a financing statement securing the same collateral
43
and listing "Joe B. Colley d/b/a Oak Hill Gun Shop" as debtor.1
Colley then transferred. all of his interest in the business to McBee.14 4 RepublicBank-Austin then loaned against the same collateral
and it filed a financing statement against "C.K. McBee dba Oak Hill
Gun Shop" as debtor.145 It should be noted that in the hotly contested priority dispute that ensued, the two financing statements
which accurately stated the legal name of the debtor went completely unchallenged, and were legally sufficient. The priority dispute
turned on whether the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop" was seriously
misleading and whether the Oak Hill financing statement was legally
sufficient. Applying the Glasco criteria, the court held that the trade
name filing was valid. McBee expanded Glasco by holding that a
trade name of an individual debtor was a proper name to be
searched.46 Even more boldly, McBee stated that in some cases, use
of the trade name might actually provide better notice than the
47
debtor's own name, because all creditors knew the trade name.'
This view suggests that the legal name of the debtor is not legally
139.

McBee, 714 F.2d at 1318. For an in depth discussion of McBee, see Morris, The

Fruits of Mischievous Seeds: Notice Filing Under Article 9 and the Continuing Problem of
Trade Names, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 241, 252-256 (1986).

140. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1318.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. Id. at 1321-22. The Glasco Court opined that such use would be seriously misleading. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr.
1981).

147.

McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321.
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sufficient, a view that is abundantly unsupported by the decisions. 148
Moreover, the element of knowledge as a critical factor in the
court's analysis presents a conflict with the federal standard of review in bankruptcy and creates separate tests based on the status of
a litigant. The Glasco/McBee approach refers to a trustee in bankruptcy as a "reasonably prudent" creditor. 149 The Glasco approach
presumes that a searcher would have knowledge of a trade name
comprehensively used by the debtor, and that a creditor should use
this knowledge in the course of its investigation of the debtor. This
knowledge is imposed even on a trustee in bankruptcy, whom Glasco
considers to be in the position of a "hypothetical but prudent creditor."' 50 The federal Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee has extensive powers "without regard to any knowledge of the trustee."' 51
Therefore, a trustee should not be treated as having knowledge of a
debtor's trade name. The attribution of knowledge of the trade name
to a searcher who is not a trustee bifurcates the test for "seriously
misleading" financing statements based on the status of the conflicting claimant as secured party or trustee. However, Section 9-402
does not contemplate one test for searches by trustees and a separate
test for knowledgeable searchers. Consequently no subsequent
searchers should be penalized with knowledge of the debtor's trade
name. The absence of legislative authority for a bifurcated test based
on the status of disputing claimants demands a contraction of the
scope of the search. Without knowledge of the trade name, the
search obligation must resume its original contours under Section 9402 and be confined to a search in the debtor's legal name only.
Without an expanded search obligation, the use of the trade name
must be scrutinized under the second tier test for seriously misleading error, 52 and the Glasco/McBee approach must therefore be
rejected.
The McBee approach involved much more than Article 9 issues
and its precedential value should be limited by its facts. The transfer
of property from Colley to McBee constituted a Bulk Sale under
Texas law, triggering application of the Bulk Sales provisions of Ar148.
149.

See supra pp. 383-89.
See Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796; McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321.

150.

Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796; see also In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 Bankr. 813, 816

(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), af'd sub nom. Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D.
Ga. 1990).

151.
152.
402(8)).

11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1990).
See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text (discussing the two-tier test of § 9-
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ticle 6.15a The transferee, McBee, failed to comply with her obliga-

tions under Article 6 to notify the transferor's creditors of the impending sale. 54 This precluded Colley's creditors from protecting
their collateral or from filing new financing statements publicizing
their security interest. 5 Article 6 provides such creditors with a six
month grace period, as opposed to a four month period under Article
9,156 to realize and act upon their interests. 157 Reasoning that a
whole Article should not be emasculated by a minor provision, the
McBee Court resolved to reach a result that effectuated Article 6
without unduly disturbing Article 9.158 From the perspective of Col-

ley's creditors, McBee's creditor should have been aware of the trade
name and the probable existence of prior creditors. The McBee
Court reasoned that a search in the trade name would not be unreasonable since such a search would disclose the filing made in the
trade name.' 59 The error, therefore, if it existed at all, was not seriously misleading. 160 Consequently the trade name filing was upheld
principally to effectuate Article 6 principles, not Article 9.16
2. The Glasco Approach: Eleventh Circuit Application.-In
153. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316, 1325 (5th Cir. 1983).
154. Id. at 1326-27; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.104, 6.105 (Vernon 1968).
155. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1326-27.
156. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(g) (Vernon 1982-83) (providing a four
month period for refiling upon the name change of the debtor).
157. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.111 (Vernon 1968). For an enlightening discussion on the interplay between Articles 6 and 9 in McBee, see Harris, The Interactionof Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities,and
Code Interpretation,39 VAND. L. REV. 179, 196-201 (1986).
158. See generally Morris, supra note 139. Professor Morris, observing that the court
should have considered .U.C.C. § 9-306(2) which provides much greater protection than Article 6, stated that "the court's extended analysis of article 6 issues suggests that it did not
appreciate the operation of § 9-306(2) and the interplay between articles 6 and 9 of the
U.C.C." Id. at 254 n.l 14.
159. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316, 1325 (5th Cir. 1983).
160. See id.
161. Other factors were not directly evident but may have guided the court to use this
approach. Colley's wife, Rita, obtained a decree of divorce the same month as Colley opened
his business and Colley refused to make alimony payments. See Ex Parte Colley, 621 S.W.2d
649, 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); McBee, 714 F.2d at 1318 (nothing that Colley operated his
business from Jan. 1979 until May 1980). Judgment on this issue in favor of his wife roughly
coincided with Colley's transfer of his business to his girlfriend, Cynthia McBee, with whom
he lived. See Colley v. Colley, 597 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (stating that judgment
was entered on April 12, 1979); McBee, 714 F.2d at 1318 (noting that on May 5, 1980 Colley
assigned his interest in the business to McBee). RepublicBank, whom the court held inferior to
the other claimants, testified that it had failed to inquire about the transaction. The McBee
opinion leaves much open to inference.
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1990, the United States District Court of Georgia resurrected the
Glasco analysis 6 2 which was previously adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit. 63 Despite strenuous and well reasoned arguments to the
contrary, the district court in Willson v. Habersham Bank,' affirming the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Simpson Motor
Co.,65 held that a financing statement was legally sufficient even
though it listed the trade name "Cornelia Car City" instead of the
debtor's legal name "Simpson Motor Company, Inc.' 6 6 Both the
debtor's status as a corporation 67 and the "total absence of any existence or business under any name other than [the debtor's] trade
name" were critical to the holding. 16 8 The Simpson Court found that
the first tier of the § 9-402(8) test, substantial compliance, 69 was
met, deciding that it was not error to use the trade name. 1 0 Applying the second part of the test, whether potential creditors would
have been misled by the debtor's name listed in the bank's financing
statement,'
the Simpson Court considered how the debtor was
known in the community by reference to the signs on the debtor's
place of business, advertising, telephone listing, checks, sales orders,
inventory schedules, designation as payee on bank drafts and other
instruments, and its reputation in the community. 17 The Willson
Court held that the trade name was not misleading because "a reasonably prudent creditor would have requested a search under the
[debtor's] trade name as well as the legal name.'1 7 3 Obviously, this
presumes that the searcher knows the trade name or would discover
162. See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 137 (discussing the Fifth Circuit split and the subsequent ruling by

the Eleventh Circuit which makes decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to Sept. 30, 1981
binding as precedent for the Eleventh Circuit).
164. 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
165.

101 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), affid sub nom. Willson v. Habersham

Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
166. Willson, 111 Bankr. at 368.
167. The distinction between individual and corporate debtors was "crucial." Compare
Simpson, 101 Bankr. at 815-16 with Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642
F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981).
168. Simpson, 101 Bankr. at 816. Apparently the certificate of incorporation for Simpson Motor Company was not sufficient evidence of existence. The file in the county office
referred to the individual. Telephone interview U.C.C. filing supervisor of Habersham County,
Georgia (Oct. 30, 1990).
169. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8); see also supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
170. Simpson, 101 Bankr. at 815 (emphasizing the searcher's option to check the trade
name index).
171. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8); see also supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
172.

Simpson, 101 Bankr. at 814-15.

173.

Willson, 111 Bankr. at 369-70.
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it in the course of business. Simpson qualified the trade name as
"the name" because it satisfied the criteria set forth in Glasco
and
174
McBee regarding consistent, exclusive, and notorious use.
The Glasco approach and its permutations enables the court to
find in favor of the earlier secured party by ostensibly using the
traditional tests set forth in Section 9-402(8). By the Glasco definition, use of the trade name substantially complies with requirements
for naming the debtor. There is no error to be evaluated and a financing statement filed in the trade name cannot be misleading to a
searcher who must conduct the search in the trade name. Thus, the
financing statement is legally sufficient and perfects the security interest of the secured party filer. This circular approach reflects a
preference for defending the status of an earlier secured party over
subsequent creditors who depend upon the functioning of the general
notice system. While Simpson, McBee, and Glasco appear to be concerned with the notice function 17 of the financing statement by
couching their evaluation in search terms, they actually ignore the
fact that a search in the legal name of the debtor would not reveal
the disputed financing statement. Rather, Simpson excuses the filer's
failure to use the legal name by expanding the subsequent searcher's
7
obligation to search under the trade name.1 1
3. Additional Difficulties with the Glasco/Simpson Approach.-The Glasco line of reasoning does not properly address the
substantial compliance test of Section 9-402(8). Instead, the requirement of the debtor's name is perceived as a function of the actual or
imputed knowledge of the disputing parties, not as an objective item
of information that must be provided in response to legislative direction and systemic needs. The criteria of notoriety, consistency, exclusivity, and business use establish knowledge of the trade name in
order to justify the preparer's use of the trade name or to justify the
174. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Not only should the trade name be
well known, but according to one commentator a court reviewing the facts should allow the

McBee approach only if it "is positive" that all creditors were aware of the debtor's trade
name and would naturally have searched under that name. Note, supra note 61, at 66-67.

175. When Simpson reached the district court on appeal, the court noted that Glasco
was "concerned with . . . '[t]he purpose of the filing system [which] is to give notice.'" Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368, 370 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (quoting Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981)).
176. In re Simpson Motor Co., 101 Bankr. 813, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), afJ'd sub
noma.Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990). In response to the trustee's argument that the filer should have been more careful and filed in the legal name, which
it knew, the court ruled that the filing was acceptable unless it was "so egregious as to breach
[the filer's] obligation of good faith." Id. at 816.
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imposition of the additional burden to search for financing statements under the debtor's trade name. With these justifications, the
errors seem minor or nonexistent, and both tiers of the § 9-402(8)
test are easily satisfied. However, the proper inquiry under Section
9-402 concerns the legal sufficiency of the financing statement, not
whether a creditor must expand the scope of its search. Converting
the seriously misleading test from a direct discovery issue into a
scope of search question substantially changes the analysis and shifts
the burdens from the filer to the searcher. The searcher is obligated
to look for filings against the debtor; the searcher should not be
obliged to undertake additional burdens to correct the mischief
caused by the filer's error. Under Glasco, McBee, and Simpson, a
search conducted in the trade name would reveal a financing statement filed in the trade name, but just as certainly, a search in the
legal name of the debtor would not have revealed the earlier filing. If
a filer can rely upon the legal name of the debtor as legally sufficient, then so too should the searcher be able to rely upon the sufficiency of its search conducted in the debtor's legal name.
This Glasco obligation to search in the trade name is premised
on the condition that the debtor uses no other name and, therefore,
no creditor would be misled by the name used. 77 As none of the
courts have defined the point in time at which exclusive use is determined, additional confusion is sure to result. Perfected status under
the Code dates from the time of filing. 17 8 It would be logical to find
that the sufficiency of an instrument upon which filing depends, and
therefore, exclusive use, should also be determined as of the date of
filing. The debtor's exclusive use of its trade name would tend to
explain a secured party's use of that name on the financing statement at that time. x7

However, the search obligation should more

realistically be linked to exclusivity at the time of the search. But if
exclusivity is determined at the time of the search, then the secured
177. See Glasco, 642 F.2d at 796 (stating that "where the company does business only
under one name, the opportunity for creditors to be misled is substantially reduced.").

178. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1989).
179. This understandable error is probably why problems arise in the first place. The
heart of the solution is encouraging awareness of the substantive purpose of preparing and
filing financing statements instead of excusing procedural compliance that defeats underlying
Code objectives. That is an ultimate U.C.C. irony: in the pursuit of elevating substance over
form, the Code is liberally construed to save defective financing statements that elevate form
over substance. If the financing statements are prepared without conscious regard for the notice purpose, the mere ritual of completing the form should not be rewarded where the potential for defeating notice is likely.
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party's perfected status depends upon events subsequent to filing; the
continued exclusivity of the debtor's trade name compelling searchers to search for filings in that name.
Justification of the secured party's use of a debtor's trade name
on the financing statement by reference to exclusivity of use is ex
post facto reasoning, since the determination of what name to use is
made before it can be determined whether the debtor will have used
only one name by the time the searcher subsequently looks for the
financing statement. Such reasoning should be rejected. The effectiveness of the financing statement should not turn on later events; it
should be independent of later events. The legal sufficiency of a financing statement should be measured against the standard legal requirements, and should be tested for substantial compliance and for
the seriously misleading nature of any errors. 180 If the statute stated
explicitly that the legal name is required, even amateurs could easily
comply. There is virtually no additional burden placed on a secured
party filer to provide the legal name on the financing statement.
Loans should be properly documented and the "reasonably prudent"
standard should apply to preparers as well as to searchers. Moreover,
if legal sufficiency depends upon exclusive use, as is the case in
Glasco, perfected status is in the hands of the debtor, who could
destroy exclusive use and perfected status by adopting additional
names. Finally, even if perfected status once attained is not subject
to defeasance by virtue of the debtor's conduct, serious questions
arise regarding the searcher's obligations which the searcher cannot
answer with reasonable certainty. If the debtor has more than one
name at the time a potential creditor is expected to search, the
search will not be extended beyond the legal name under Glasco,18'
and the standard search will not reveal financing statements in the
trade name. It would be unreasonable to expect a searcher to deter182
mine when or whether a debtor used a trade name exclusively.
4. Tri-Partite Disputes and the Circular Priority Problem.-Suppose the corporate debtor's legal name is "Man in New
Dimensions, Inc.," and that the name on the financing statement is
180. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989).
181. See Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir.
'Unit B Apr. 1981). The Glasco criteria include the finding of exclusivity. See discussion at
infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
182., The debtor may not remember other trade names, nor should a secured party be
expected to rely on the debtor. Furthermore, fictitious registration systems do not enable discovery of trade names.
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the trade name "MIND, INC.," which is based on the acronym for
the corporate name. Assume that the financing statement was filed
by the secured party First Bank in the appropriate places' 8 3 on July
13, 1988. Assume that in August, 1990 the debtor opened a new
establishment in a neighboring county under the name "Mind Over
Matter." Both establishments sell computers and related equipment
and software. Under Glasco, if a routine search were made in 1989,
the subsequent potential creditor would be obliged to conduct a
search in the legal name and trade name of the corporation, and
First Bank would have a perfected security interest as against Second Bank. But if Second Bank searched in September, 1990, what is
the effect and status of First Bank's 1988 filing?
Did First Bank have a perfected security interest for two years,
until 1990 when the debtor began using another trade name? If so,
the debtor can actually destroy the perfected status by his own actions. 8 4 Or did the subsequent use of an additional trade name,
making the earlier trade name's use non-exclusive, mean that First
Bank had no perfected status at all, even from the beginning of those
two years? Perfection cannot be a creation that springs into being or
evaporates based on events subsequent to the filing. The time for
imposing the obligation to expand the search to include the trade
name, if the obligation is imposed at all, is the time that the subsequent creditor enters into the transaction with the debtor. This time
frame will necessarily determine perfected status, by application of
Section 9-402(8) as interpreted by Glasco and Simpson. A subsequent creditor who is under no obligation to search in the trade
name will, in searching under the debtor's legal name only, not discover a trade name that is substantially different from the legal
name, and will not take subject to the undiscovered earlier filing.
Conversely, a subsequent creditor obligated to search under the
trade name by virtue of the debtor's exclusive use of it at the time of
the subsequent creditor's transaction with the debtor, will lose to the
prior discovered secured party. The operation of the Glasco rule conflicts with the statutory rules for priority, which relate to the dates of
the filings, not to the dates of any search obligations or creditor
183. Pursuant to § 9-401 of the applicable state Code, filing may be made locally in the
county, centrally in the Office of the Secretary of State, or in both places. See U.C.C. § 9-401

(1989).
184. This ignores for the moment the creditor's own actions regarding the name on the
financing statement.
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knowledge. 185 This hypothetical illustrates that besides exclusivity,
the Glasco elements of notoriety and consistency are also open to
question. A name well known in 1988 will not necessarily be
remembered in 1991. The status quo is not a prediction of the future. Yet it is the future creditor for whom the filing must provide
notice. A popular public name may change. Even a legal name may
change; but there is a mechanism for tracing the legal name reliably,
whereas there is no such system for tracing trade names if they are
not already known. The only reliable standard for a system is the
legal name at the time of filing. Moreover, the Glasco analysis disintegrates in a priority conflict involving more than two claimants, as
illustrated by continuing the hypothetical.
If the trade name "MIND, INC.," is consistently and exclusively used at the time of First Bank's filing, First Bank might be
said to have perfected status under Glasco. Subsequently, Second
Bank files in the debtor's legal name even though the debtor, "Man
in New Dimensions, Inc.," still uses the trade name "MIND, INC.,"
exclusively and consistently. 8 6 Under Glasco Second Bank would
lose to First Bank because Second Bank could have discovered First
Bank's security interest'by searching under the trade name.
If Trinity Bank files in the legal name of the corporation in January, 1991, while the debtor is using both trade names, neither trade
name remains consistently or exclusively used. Trinity Bank is therefore under no obligation to search for MIND, INC. and First Bank's
filing would remain hidden. First Bank would lose to Trinity Bank,
but Trinity Bank would lose to Second Bank. Both Second Bank and
Trinity Bank perfected in the legal name and the standard priority
rules render the victory to the first perfected, here Second Bank over
Trinity Bank. Since First Bank was not discoverable at the time of
Second Bank's filing, the circular priority loop renders First Bank
superior to Second Bank, Second Bank superior to Trinity Bank, and
Trinity Bank superior to First Bank.
This hypothetical illustrates that the Glasco analysis produces
inconsistent and anomalous results. In the tripartite dispute, First
Bank is perfected with respect to Second Bank, but unperfected with
185. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1989) (listing the rules of priority between creditors); id. § 9312 (setting forth priority rules between conflicting secured parties dependant upon the date of

filing or perfection).
186. Once the legal name is used by Second Bank, exclusive and consistent use is destroyed by definition, since the debtor has just used a name other than the trade name to
transact business.
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respect to Trinity Bank. This dual and contradictory status has no
statutory basis and is at odds with the concept of an organized and
reliable system. Where the fundamental purpose of the system is to
provide notice of the potential existence of prior claims, contradictory status cannot be countenanced.
This contradictory status of "floating perfection" flows from the
Glasco requirement of searching in the debtor's trade name where
the use of such name is exclusive. Perfected status depends upon the
scope of the search of the subsequent creditor. Where the trade
name was exclusively used, as it was at the time Second Bank perfected its security interest, Second Bank would be obligated to conduct a search under the trade name as well as the legal name, and
would be inferior to First Bank's status. At the time of Trinity's interest, however, the use of the trade name was non-exclusive, and
Trinity's search would be sufficient if conducted under the legal
name only. Trinity would therefore prevail over First Bank although
it would be inferior to Second Bank who had perfected under the
debtor's legal name. Second Bank would be defeated by the person
who lost to the party over whom Second Bank prevailed. There is no
method in the Glasco analysis to resolve the circular priority contest.
The analysis fails to provide a logically consistent method for resolving priority disputes, and the Glasco test therefore fails to establish a
meaningful standard for interpreting the seriously misleading test of
Section 9-402(8). Any name similarity test is also potentially subject
to this circular priority, because the discoverability depends upon
circumstances that may change over time. The integrity of a system
based on name similarity, although not perfect, is more defensible
than one based on a trade name/legal name dichotomy because it is
independent of any individual debtor's manipulation. In name similarity cases, the circumstances may relate to volume of filings, type
of system, or size of the community, factors which are not within the
control of the debtor.
By contrast, in Glasco and in Simpson, the nonexclusive use of
the trade name is totally within the control of the debtor, even
though the system is designed to protect creditors. The circular priority problem would not arise in a system that requires the use only
of the debtor's legal name. The use of the debtor's legal name is
particularly desirable in an electronic data system, which measures
the searched name against the target name through comparison of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:365

electronic impulses not through human perception. 18 7
5. The Impact of Section 9-402(7) on Trade Name Cases, and
Non-Uniform Amendments.-Section 9-402(7) was enacted to en-

courage the use of the debtor's legal name. 88 Despite Florida's enactment of Section 9-402(7) subsequent to Glasco, the Willson
Court regarded Glasco as controlling 89 because Section 9-402(7)
does not explicitly state that filing under the trade name is insuffi-

cient.190 According to Willson, since 9-402(7) does not require the
legal name, the Florida amendment did not affect the precedential
authority of Glasco. 9 ' The Willson Court observed that the Georgia
legislature declined to retire the use of the trade or true name when
it adopted the standard U.C.C. § 9-402(7) despite extensive debates
over which name should be used on the financing statement. 92 Had
the legislature intended a trade name filing to be insufficient, concluded Willson, the Georgia legislative could have written the stat93
ute accordingly.1
Texas recently adopted an amendment that requires the use of

the debtor's legal name or a name that is so similar that the financing statement would be discovered upon a search conducted in the
debtor's legal name.'94 The Texas modification requires a trade
name filing to withstand vigorous review including identification of
the debtor, substantial resemblance to the debtor's name, and dis187. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-18, at 1037-38
(3d ed. 1988) (discussing computer searches).
188. For a discussion and the text of Section 9-402(7), see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
189. Glasco, a Fifth Circuit case, became binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit
under Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). See supra note 137.
190. Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bank. 368, 369 (N.D. Ga. 1990). Glasco was
decided under Florida law prior to enactment of § 9-402(7). See id. The governing provisions
of the Georgia statute in Willson were identical to the Florida statute as amended. See id. The
Official Comments urging non-use of the trade name were tersely dismissed as "not the law,"
and not applicable to corporations since only partnerships and proprietorships were mentioned
in § 9-402(7). Id. But see U.S. Cylinders, Inc. v. Vital Breathing Prod., Inc. (In re Vital
Breathing Prod., Inc.), 98 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (removing itself from Glasco's
grip in reliance on the post-Glasco Florida amendment and other distinguishing facts).
191. In re Simpson Motor Co,, 101 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), affd sub nom.
Willson v. Habersham Bank, 111 Bankr. 368 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
192. Willson, IIl Bankr. at 369.
193. Id.
194. TEx. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(g) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (stating that
"[fliling under a trade name or assumed name alone shall not be sufficient to perfect a security interest unless the trade name or assumed name is so similar to the debtor's legal name
that the trade name or assumed name filing would be discovered in a search of the filing
officer's records."). The Texas amendment became effective Sept. 1, 1989. Id.
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closure in response to a routine search of the debtor's legal name. 195
The Texas amendment clearly limits the scope of a reasonable
search to requests in the debtor's legal name, thereby shifting to the
secured party filer the risk of using a name other than the debtor's
legal name. By referring to discovery of the financing statement
through a search of the filing officer's records, 96 the legislature conveyed its expectation that an evaluation of legal sufficiency should
consider actual filing practices. Its non-uniform language notwithstanding, the Texas statutory response to the confusion attending
Section 9-402 is a most welcome step to satisfying the goals of uniform practice and interpretation. 97 Enactment of non-standard variations of the U.C.C. in order to clarify the ambiguities of Section 9402 may, ironically, lead to a more uniform application and
interpretation.
6. Shifting Burdens.-The burden of obtaining the correct
name and determining the business structure is minimal, usually requiring nothing more than a Certificate of Good Standing from the
Secretary of State's Office and a review of current corporate or partnership documents. In a properly documented transaction these documents are routinely reviewed 198 so the additional burden is non-existent. The only purpose for relieving the secured party filer of this
burden is to affect the outcome of litigation in order to protect the
secured party filer despite its failure to provide the proper name on
the financing statement.
Imposing the burden on the subsequent creditor to search under
various names because the secured party filer was relieved by the
court of any obligation it may have had to file under the correct
name of the debtor, creates tremendous system wide inefficiencies,
promotes litigation, and is unfair. At the time of entering into the
195. For a discussion of these criteria, see In re Waters, 90 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1988), discussed at infra notes 321-28 and accompanying text, and In re Platt, 257 F.
Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966), discussed at infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
196. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE AiN. § 9.402(g) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
197. See American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schepps, No. 01-88-00570-CV (Tex. Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Tex file) (noting that if the amended Texas Code

§ 9.402(g) had been in effect at the time the secured party filed its financing statement in the
debtor's trade name, its filing would not have been effective). The court held that the trade
name was not seriously misleading, however, it should be noted that since American Savings is

an unpublished decision, pursuant to Rule 90(i) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, it
has no precedential value.
198. Review is recommended, if for no other reasons than to determine that borrowing
for the designated purposes is authorized and within the scope of the business, and to reduce
concern over non-payment of taxes and other fees.
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transaction with the debtor the subsequent creditor does not know
that litigation will result; the subsequent creditor does not even know
that it is "subsequent" if the results of its search do not indicate a
previous claimant. Retroactive imposition of additional search obligations operates as a penalty on a person who is not aware of the
existence of the obligation at the point in time when it might have
been capable of fulfillment. Penalizing a person for failure to fulfill
an obligation that such person did not even know existed is not
within the spirit of the U.C.C., which specifically rejects punitive
damages measures.' 9 9 The only way to preclude a post hoc invalidation result 2 0 is for the subsequent creditor to conduct multiple
searches with respect to all transactions with all debtors, because it
does not know in advance which debtor transactions will eventually
be litigated. This burden will affect all creditors at the time of entering into transactions with all debtors, because no creditor can be
sure of its status unless all avenues of search have been exhausted.
Since any number of trade names may be used, the searches are
potentially limitless, and there is no certainty in knowing whether or
when a search is complete. The suggestion that an expanded search
is necessary only where one trade name is used does not mitigate the
searcher's burden, since exclusive use of only one name may also be
open to debate. A debtor may no longer use only one trade name,
trapping the'searcher into believing that there may not have been a
time of exclusive use of one name.
At the very least there may be legal disputes over the existence
and duration of exclusive use, attendant problems of knowledge and
proof, and interpretation of the new burden fostering further uncertainty over the nature and extent of obligations. To say that the
scope of a reasonable search in the usual case consists of a search in
only the legal name, but that in this particular dispute the scope of
the search includes additional search obligations, creates a non-system of "floating obligations," which is a legal oxymoron. Obligations
must be fixed and known in advance to provide a reasonable opportunity for the obligor to fulfill the obligations. The retrospective imposition of search obligations should be judicially and legislatively
199. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1989). While not exactly punitive damages, the concept is
broad enough to apply, where in effect the subsequent claimant is damaged to the extent of the
loss of its interest and the value thereof, as a penalty for failing to meet extended burdens.
200. By retrospectively imposing an increased burden of search that the subsequent
creditor failed to meet, the court may divest the subsequent creditor of rights it thought it had
in the debtor's collateral.
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discouraged.
Finally, the imposition of a general obligation to search all of
the debtor's names, or more than the debtor's legal name, is inefficient in the extreme. Most transactions identify the debtor by the
correct name, so searches for other names would be fruitless or redundant. 20 1 Most transactions reach successful conclusion without
dispute, and searches beyond the minimum are, therefore, of no
consequence.
C. The Third Category: The Second Tier Test of Minor and
Not Seriously Misleading Errors
At least two different formulations of the two-tier test have developed. One approach applies the Section 9-402(8) test from the
perspective of the secured party filer. This test provides that the
name of the person legally responsible for the debt should be used
unless names are so similar that a prospective creditor, upon seeing
the trade name in the records, would be alerted that there might be
a prior security interest in the involved collateral. 202 This approach
assumes discovery and relies upon the subjective perceptions of a
searcher to make a connection between the name stated on the financing statement and the debtor's name. If the name used appears
similar to the legal name, the error is regarded as minor. This approach suggests coincidental discovery, because the error is viewed
on its face and not in the actual context of that state's filing system.
By contrast, other courts structure the analysis from the perspective of the subsequent searcher. This formulation of the seriously
misleading test of Section 9-402(8) inquires whether, in the course
of a routine search for the debtor's name, the errant filing would be
revealed. This approach employs an objective standard to investigate
whether the errant filing would be discovered by reference to specific
facts and constraints of the applicable filing and search system and
calls for systematic discovery as a prerequisite to legal sufficiency.
Both perspectives focus on the second tier of the analysis, with
different emphasis on the elements. The filers tend to view errors as
201. Such searches would not reveal any additional useful information. See National
Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316, 1321 (5th Cir.

1983).
202.

Kelley v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank (In re Adams), 102 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. M.D.

Ga. 1989); Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 53 (M.D. Ga. 1979); McMillin v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1975). In both
Adams and Ansley the trade names were found not sufficient to perfect the security interest.
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minor; the searchers may regard the same errors as seriously misleading. The more modern cases focus less on whether the names are
similar and more on whether the similarity will routinely lead to actual notice.20 3
1. Minor Errors and Name Similarity: Platt and Progeny.-In re Platt °4 continues to be relied upon as the principal case
validating the use of the debtor's trade name provided it closely resembles the debtor's legal name. "The Platt decision stands for the
proposition that where the debtor's trade name is substantially similar to the debtor's true name, the failure to include the true name
with the trade name is not a seriously misleading error."2 0 5 Ironically, the referee in Platt referred to the name issue as only "satellite to the central question," 206 which concerned the sufficiency of the
collateral description concerning after-acquired property. 0 7 With respect to the name issue, the referee in bankruptcy noted that the first
secured party, a bank, had properly perfected by filing financing
statements under the names Henry Platt and Platt Fur Company,
and that the financing statements had been indexed under both
names. The filing by the junior creditor, F.C.A., named only Platt
Fur Company as the debtor. A search of the public records under
the name of the debtor Henry Platt would not have disclosed the
junior creditor's financing statement. 0 8 Since the earlier secured
party received priority by the referee's decision on the after-acquired
property issue, the referee concluded that the name issue did not affect the outcome. In an ambiguous statement, the referee noted the
absence of any evidence that would "affect the effectiveness of
203.
204.

See infra notes 320-47 and accompanying text.
257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

205. Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898, 901
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988).
206. In re Platt, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 275, 282 (E.D. Pa.), vacated on other
grounds, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

207. The question in Platt was whether the financing statement was sufficient to perfect
a security interest in the debtor's after-acquired inventory, accounts receivable, and proceeds
where the financing statement described the collateral simply as "inventory and accounts receivable." The referee held that the financing statement need not contain a specific reference
to after-acquired property and that the first secured party, the bank, was entitled to retain the
collected receivables, since in the hands of the secured party they lost their character as proceeds. Id. at 280-282. The district court reversed the referee on this point and precluded the
bank's recovery of certain proceeds, holding that the bank's failure to claim proceeds on the
financing statement was "gross negligence" and "seriously misleading." In re Platt, 257 F.
Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
208. Platt, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 282.
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F.C.A's financing statement as being seriously misleading" 20 9 and
seemed to explain the absence in terms of the earlier creditor, the
bank, having no obligation to search the public records for subsequent filings.
The district court construed the referee's brief comments as a
finding by the referee that the name "Platt Fur Company" was "not
seriously misleading, ' 210 despite the fact that F.C.A's interest would
not have been disclosed by a search of the public record. The district
court held that the designation of Henry Platt as Platt Fur Co. was
"sufficiently related to the name of the debtor, Henry Platt, to require those who search the records to make further investigation."211
The name similarity test articulated by Platt compared the name
used on the financing statement to the legal name, on the assumption
that if the names were similar, the financing statement would be
found.21 2
That a name on a financing statement may be "sufficiently related" to the name of the debtor presumes either (1) that the defective filing has been discovered so that there is something to compare,
or (2) that discovery is irrelevant because the comparison is made
prima facie, without regard to discovery. A prima facie comparison
would tend to justify the insignificance of the error from the
preparer's viewpoint, without regard to the impact of the error. Platt
appears to have made a prima facie comparison because the presumption that the financing statement was discovered ran contrary
to the Referee's finding of fact. On the other hand, the Platt's reference to further investigation suggested that the obligation to make
further inquiry depended upon finding the financing statement in the
public records.
The Platt decision achieved instant prominence as the first opinion applying the seriously misleading standard to trade name usage.
Platt's disproportionate impact on trade name filing cases remains
visible even in current decisions, which seem compelled to mention
Platt's"sufficiently related" test21 3 or the Platt decision generally. 1 4
209. Id.
210. Platt, 257 F. Supp. at 482.
211. Id.
212. See id. Platt presumed that the searcher would discover the filing and be bound to
examine the financing statement. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn),
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 573 (D. Me. 1970).
213. See U.S. Cylinders Inc. v. Vital Breathing Prod., Inc. (In re Vital Breathing Prod.,
Inc.), 98 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding a financing statement ineffective where
there is no similarity of names); Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94
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What is rarely mentioned, however, is that Platt overlooked the
problem of actual non-disclosure of the trade name filing in the public records while simultaneously suggesting that disclosure was necessary. Platt illustrated dissimilarity by pointing out that while
"Platt Fur Company" was similar to Henry Platt, "Kenwell Fur
Company," Henry Platt's other trade name, would not be "sufficiently related" to the debtor's true name to be discoverable, and

therefore would be seriously misleading. 1 5 The "sufficiently related"
test is alternatively stated in terms of "substantial similarity." '
Following Platt, trade names, particularly those that commence
with the debtor's last name, have been upheld.21 17 Many other trade

names fail the similarity test for obvious reasons. For example,
"Kalthoff Heating & Cooling" bears no similarity to "James
White."2 8" The dissimilarity may be so great that the financing
statement does not substantially comply with Code requirements. 1 9
2. The Necessary Evolution of the Name Similarity Test.-

Earlier cases such as In re Nara Non-Food Distributing Inc.22 0 and
222
In re Excel Stores, Inc.2 2 and the recent case, In re Strickland,

Bankr. 898 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988) (holding a financing statement effective if the trade
name is substantially similar to the debtor's true name).
214. See In re Farm & Home Supply, Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1081,
1085 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (calling the Platt opinion and its "sufficiently related test" mere dicta).
215. See In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
216. See' Brown v. Belarus Mach., Inc. (In re Service Lawn & Power, Inc.), 83 Bankr.
515, 518 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (articulating its version of Platt: the financing statement is
effective to perfect the security interest if the true name and trade name are "so substantially
similar that a diligent creditor upon searching under the true name would likely discover the
filing.").
217. See, e.g., In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In re Nara Non-Food
Distrib. Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1970), affd, 36 A.D.2d 796, 320
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971); In re Reeco Elec. Co., 415 F. Supp. 238 (D. Me. 1976); Pongetti v.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1988) (finding that "Strickland Builders MFG Company" and "Strickland Builders and Supply Company" were both "sufficiently similar" to "James Terence Strickland" to be effective).
218. In re White, 51 Bankr. 514 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn 1985) (stating that the dissolution
of a partnership requires a new filing in the debtor's real name); see also Bell v. Ameritrust
Co. (In re Moore), 21 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (stating that a filing in only one
of the debtor's trade names, instead of the debtor's correct name, was insufficient); Carter v.
Greene County Bank (In re Wilhoit), 6 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that a
filing in a creditor's trade name did not perfect its security interest in the debtor's equipment).
219. In re Eichler held that the use of "Carriage Card & Record Shop" instead of Carl
Eichler, Jr. did not comply with U.C.C. § 9-402 because it was merely a title, and not the
name of the debtor, who is a person. In re Eichler, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1406
(E.D. Wis. 1971).
220. 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1970), affid, 36 A.D.2d 796, 320
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971).
221. 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965).
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typify the former approach, and continue to be cited as principal
cases. The use of similar names generally constituted only a minor
error. Nara and Excel presumed that the name would be found because of the similarity. "Nara Dist. Inc." was held substantially similar to the true name "Nara Non-Food Distributing Inc." because
anyone who thumbed through the index would discover the defective
filing. Once found, the searcher was expected to make the connection
that the defective financing statement intended to refer to the
debtor, and one could therefore conclude that the financing statement effectively provided notice. 2 13 In Excel, the secured party filed
a conditional sales contract bearing the signature "Excel Department Stores by Andrew F. Machado" instead of "Excel Stores, Inc.
by Andrew F. Machado, Treasurer. "224 The district court held that,
while the conditional sales agreement was valid and binding between
the parties, the errors in failing to use the correct corporate name
and failing to designate the official capacity of the officer were seriously misleading to creditors entitled to rely upon the public record.2 25 The circuit court reversed the district court, construing the
absence of corporate designation as a minor error.226 The court held
that the conditional sales contract gave the minimum information
necessary to put searchers on notice. 227 In the court's view, the defective filing would be found because the name used was similar to
the true name. Furthermore, as in Nara, the name was an unusual
name. The court presumed that a person knowledgeable about the
debtor Excel Stores, Inc, would discover the Excel Department
Stores filing, recognize the signature, and would have obtained further information from the corporate officer.228
The Excel filing was made less than three months after the
222. Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1988).
223. Nara, 66 Misc. 2d at 780, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
224. Excel, 341 F.2d at 963. A conditional sales contract is substantially a security
agreement. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment (1989). A security agreement is sufficient as a
financing statement if it contains the requisite information and the signature of the debtor. Id.
§ 9-402(1).
225. In re Excel Stores, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 616, 620 (D. Conn.
1963), rev'd, 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965). In the absence of U.C.C. guidelines on this issue
the district court applied general principles of Connecticut corporate law. Id.
226. In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961, 962 (2d Cir. 1965).
227. Id. at 963. But see First State Bank v. Shirley AG Serv., 417 N.W.2d 448, 451
(Iowa 1987) (distinguishing a security agreement from a financing statement because a security agreement "does not purport 'to lead' anyone to anything.").
228. Excel, 341 F.2d at 963.
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U.C.C. became effective in Connecticut in 1961,229 and in the context of the infancy of the filing system of the time, these presumptions approached probable certainty. Moreover, the secured party's
errors were understandable in view of the differing roles of a security
agreement and financing statement2 3 0° The sole function of a financing statement is to provide notice, but security agreements create the
substantive transaction. It is unlikely that the immediate parties to
the agreement were aware of the significance of a precise name designation on their agreement, and even less aware of any particular
consequence to third parties. Even the Code did not specifically set
forth a separate requirement for the name of the debtor, and the
emphasis on the name of the debtor is far less obvious in a security
agreement than in a financing statement, where the form highlights
the need to state the name separately from the signature. Although
the security agreement may be binding on the parties even if it does
not accurately state the name of the debtor,23 1 such a security agreement if filed as a financing statement is not sufficient protection
against subsequent creditors.2 32
The use 'of the security agreement is specifically sanctioned by
the Code as a filing instrument without modification.2 33 Where the
security agreement is effective between the parties,2 34 and especially
229. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-10-101 (1958 & Supp. 1959) (stating that "[tihis
title shall apply to transactions entered into and events occurring on and after October 1,
1961."); Excel, I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 618 (noting that the financing statement
was filed on Dec. 22, 1961).
230. Although a security agreement may constitute a valid financing statement, a financing statement meeting only minimum requirements will not be deemed a sufficient security agreement. J. WrHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 187, § 22-18, at 1031. The security agreement creates a security interest while the financing statement serves to notify creditors that
further inquiry with reference to particular collateral is necessary. See Interstate Steel Co. v.
Ramm Manuf. Corp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 404, 409, 438 N.E. 2d 1381, 1385 (1982) (citing
Marine Midland Bank - Eastern Nat'l Assoc. v. Conerty Pontiac - Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d
311, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1974)).
231. In re Penn Hous. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 661, 665 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (stating that the
security agreement was executed in the debtor's trade name Erie Builders Supply Company
and was effective to create the security interest sufficient for attachment purposes; the financing statement was filed in the debtor's correct corporate name, Penn Housing Corporation).
232. In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 372 (M.D. Ga. 1973).
233. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1989) (permitting the security agreement signed by both
parties to operate as a financing statement if it meets the requirements of § 9-402(1)).
234. The casual use of a completely different name in lieu of the debtor's real name on
the conditional sales contract would not defeat the agreement between the immediate parties
because they are easily identifiable to one another; it will, however, preclude perfection even
though the debtor's name on the financing statement is extracted from the conditional sales
contract. See National Cash Register Co. v. Mishkin's 125th St., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 317
N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970). In Mishkin, the seller of equipment sued the seller of the
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where actual notice is likely to result despite errors, the reluctance of
a court to set aside perfected status of a secured party who had
taken the steps required by the Code, is understandable. However,
such leniency in interpretation may no longer be justified. Consequently, cases applying Section 9-402(8) to save defective security
agreements filed as financing statements should be of limited precedential value, particularly if those decisions were rendered during
the Code's early years. Liberal construction should not be necessary
in this mature age of U.C.C. filings.
The Excel decision, which in effect justified the actions of the
secured party, spawned decisions that tolerated wide deviations in
recitation of the debtor's name. More recently, Heckathorn Construction Co. v. Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (In re Bass
Mechanical Contractors, Inc.),2 35 held a financing statement sufficient under the Nara and Excel branch of the Platt name similarity
test. The only similarity between the legal name and the name used
on the financing statement was the first word. But in the court's
view, "[a] reasonable person making a lien search would have been
expected to look under the alphabetic letter 'B' [for "Bass"] and
would have noticed the similarity of names," between the name discovered, "Bass Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, Inc." and the existing
legal name, "Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 2 36 In the court's
view, the searcher was on notice of the similarity, and the searcher
should have contacted the secured party named in the errant filing.
Presumably, the searcher should have inquired whether "Bass
Plumbing" was the same entity as "Bass Mechanical," or whether
the secured party had intended to perfect a security interest in "Bass
Mechanical" even though the financing statement said "Bass Plumbing." Since this was the type of search the trustee, or any claimant,
should reasonably have conducted,2 37 the Bass Court held that the
business to establish the priority to certain cash registers. Although the correct name of the
debtor purchaser was Aberdeen Drugs Co., Inc., the conditional sales contract and the financing statement incorrectly listed the name as Mishkin's Drug, Inc. The security interest was
enforceable against the debtor but was held unperfected as to third parties even though actual
notice was available through visual inspection of the equipment claimed as collateral.
235. 84 Bankr. 1009, 1021 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).

236. Id. This of course presumes that the searcher must look through an entire list of
"Bass" entries and not stop after "Bass M . . ." the way one normally would if consulting a
telephone list, for example, for the business "Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc."
237.

Id. The search described actually was conducted by the debtor's attorney while

preparing to file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of his clients, a corporation and its two shareholders, a married couple. The court regarded this search to be the type of search a secured

party should conduct.
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error in the name of the debtor was minor and not seriously
misleading.
The presumptions of discovery and recognition inherent in the
Nara,3 8 Excel, 39 and Bass2 40 approach are not valid given today's
volume of filings nor are they valid in computerized systems. The
mere fact that the searcher in Bass would have "noticed" the similarity suggests more than mere observation. It presumes discovery,
for without discovery there could be no comparison. It presumes review and comparison of "similar" statements. In a third level of assumption, the Bass analysis presumes a subjective cognitive element
on the part of the searcher. Anticipating that a connection will be
made in the searcher's mind speaks not to the legal sufficiency of a
financing statement but to the subjective knowledge of the searcher
or to the discretion of a search clerk. Since perceptions vary significantly, the effectiveness of the financing statement is made to depend, under this analytical approach, not on its own inherent value
but on a subjective recognition factor and other variable circumstances. Under this post hoc review of name similarity, legal sufficiency is made to depend iot on the application of a legal standard
of review, but on coincidence of discovery and individual subjective
perceptions of name similarity. The integrity of a system is undermined by such coincidence and conjecture. A potential secured party
searcher should not be vulnerable to an ex post facto decision of the
court that the searcher should have had the hindsight cognitive wisdom of the court. A searcher should be able to rely on the system to
determine status at the time of engaging in the transaction with the
debtor.
The Bass Court determined that the names "Bass Plumbing,
Heating & Cooling, Inc." and "Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc."
were similar and therefore not seriously misleading. 2 41 The Bass
Court awarded perfected status to the earlier creditor despite the
defective filing, and in so doing the court limited the rights of subsequent creditors. It is therefore critical to reexamine the operation of
the name similarity test.
238. In re Nara Non-Food Distrib. Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
1970), arfd, 36 A.D.2d 796, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971).
239. In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965).
240. Heckathorn Constr. Co. v. Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (In re Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc.), 84 Bankr. 1009 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).
241. Id.
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3. Examination of the Name Similarity Test: Illustration by
Hypothetical and Expanded Searches.-Suppose that a search of
the files would reveal:
Bass
Bass
Bass
Bass
Bass
Bass

Fishing Supplies Co., Inc.
Furniture Ltd.
Office Supplies, Inc.
Office Equipment
Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, Inc.
Refrigeration Units Discount House.

Are the names above any more or less similar to one another
than "Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc." and "Bass Plumbing,
Heating & Cooling, Inc.," those that the Bass Court concluded were
similar?2 42 How is similarity defined - by alphabetical order, substantive content, or another category? Other than identity of words,
there are no guides for determining the similarity of names. Similarity of spelling, pronunciation, identity of certain words, or substantive meaning may be nothing more than coincidence. Must the
searcher nevertheless contact each of the named secured parties? If
the name "Smith" were substituted, should the searcher's obligations
be redefined? It is far from clear which names are "unusual," a relevant factor in Nara, Excel, and apparently in Bass. Seventy-six filings appeared under the name "Ansley" in Citizens Bank v. Ansley.2 43 Is "Ansley" an unusual name that warrants further investigation? What search obligation should be imposed if "Ansley" were
the first word in the example above? The Ansley Court distinguished
Nara and Excel on the grounds that the names on the financing
statements and the legal names were all business names with the
same unusual first name, and therefore subsequent creditors could be
expected to examine all the filings under that unusual name. Since
242.

The first two entries might be alphabetically similar, but heating & cooling and

refrigeration might be substantively similar in type of business. "Bass Mechanical Contractors,
Inc." is not on the list because no filing was made in the debtor's legal name and therefore it

would not be revealed in a search of the files. Under Bass, if the names in this hypothetical list
had been revealed, the searcher would probably be required to investigate whether "Bass Re-

frigeration Units Discount House" or any of a number of other listings represented the debtor
because of potentially similar business operations.
243. 467 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Ga.), affid, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979). The court in

McMillin v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler), 407 F. Supp. 799, 803 (W.D. Okla.
1975), held that the financing statement must show the name of the debtor legally responsible

for the debt "unless the trade name and the individual debtor's name are so similar that a
prospective creditor, upon seeing the trade name in the records, would be alerted that there

might be a prior security interest in the involved collateral." Similarity is in the perception of
the holder, interpreted by the court.
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the legal name in Ansley was a personal, not business name, and was
fairly common, the searcher was relieved of any obligation to conduct inquiries regarding any filings not in the debtor's true name. 4"
It should be apparent that a different court, or a different searcher,
might be justified in concluding that the names were not similar,
except for the coincidental first word.
Identity of the first word is not a guarantee of similarity, however, as demonstrated by Sencore, Inc. v. Pongetti (In re Columbus
Typewriter Co.).24 Despite the identity of the first word, "Columbus
Business Machines" was "too dissimilar" from "Columbus Typewriter Company, Inc." under the court's interpretation of the seriously misleading standard to save the defective filing. The Columbus
Court focused on the dissimilarity: "Is the debtor's trade name so
materially different from its correct corporate name that creditors
who search the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) records under the
debtor's corporate name would be unable to locate a financing statement filed under the debtor's trade name?"24 Columbus combined
the similarity, or dissimilarity, test with the standard search test, 241
which asks "would a subsequent creditor looking under [the debtor's
true name] be led to find the security interest filed and indexed
under [the trade name, or name given on the financing statement] ?'' 24 Answering in the negative, the Columbus Court intimated that the status of the debtor as a corporation or a natural
person affects the boundaries of name similarity and that geographical names are too common.24 This in itself illustrates the serious
limitations of a "name similarity test." Boundaries are not defined
and too many rules are invented to fit the facts. There should be a
unitary, consistent, legally sound approach interpreting the provisions of Section 9-402(8) that applies standard tests in a systematic,
uniform fashion.
244. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. at 52, 55.
245. 75 Bankr. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1987).
246. Id. at 836.
247. Id. at 838. The Columbus Court, two years later, delivered Strickland, which
seemed to apply the standard search test but rejected evidence of the actual operation of the
system. Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1988). "Strickland" as a shared first word was sufficient, but "Columbus" as the shared
first word was not.
248. Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785, 787 (2d
Cir. 1972), cited in Columbus, 75 Bankr. at 836.
249. See Sencore, Inc. v. Pongetti (In re Columbus Typewriter Co.), 75 Bankr. 834
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1987). It is not clear which geographical names this disqualification would
apply to nor what other names are suspect.
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Would a court, comparing all of the choices listed above, rather
than only two, still conclude that the two names were similar? If
"substantial similarity" is to be a meaningful test, the perception of
similarity should not change simply because additional choices are
available or absent. In a system that depends upon assumptions of
discovery, perceptions of similarity, and "mental leaps,' 2 50 connecting the discovered filing to the debtor depends upon too many assumptions. A "test" that tolerates too many assumptions lacks integrity and is no test at all.
The Bass analysis provokes serious questions about the scope of
a reasonable search. If the search were limited to the initial and terminal points within which an alphabetized entry should be located,
the defective filing might not have been discovered in Bass.25 ' A reasonable search that required the searcher to look only between "Bass
Furniture Ltd." and "Bass Office Supplies, Inc." would not produce
a listing under "Bass Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, Inc." which
was the trade name. If the search must instead encompass the entire
"Bass" listing or scan all the "B's," the probability of discovering
the errant filing increases and the gravity of error correspondingly
decreases. Pursuant to the Excel or Bass approach, the degree to
which an error is seriously misleading is inversely related to the
scope of a reasonable routine search. The scope of a reasonable
search varies from case to case. Upon discovery, what is the scope of
the inquiry? Must an inquiry be made concerning all similar filings?
It should be limited to the search for the debtor's correct legal name
only, with clearly defined initial and terminal points. The scope of
the search should be defined by the name itself.
Reference to the legal name is critically important if the search
is to be conducted by computers. The advent of electronic search
systems necessitates adjustments in the mechanics of filing and
searching and a substantial review of legal tests that use name similarity concepts to determine whether a name error is seriously misleading. 52 A re-evaluation of the viability of tests and relevant pro250. Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 53 (M.D. Ga.), afl'd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir. 1979).
251. The search for "Bass Mechanical" would have ended with the filing under "Bass
Office Supplies, Inc." See supra p. 414.
252.

But see Morris, supra note 139, at 269 (stating that computers should not alter

analysis, but that computer programs should be adjusted to show the target name, and the
name before and after to accommodate the name similarity test). This view is not convincing.
Even if computers could be easily programmed to do so, it is not at all clear that results would
be predictable, or that notice would be available, because new filings could change the adja-
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visions of the Uniform Commercial Code is consonant with the
explicit provisions of the Code to modernize and encourage efficiency
and development. 5 3
The recent case In re Strickland254 takes an even more extreme
approach than its predecessors. Strickland applies the name similarity test to the errors in the financing statement from the perspective
of the secured party filer. Under apparent concern for the discoverability of the filing, Strickland ignores the operation of the filing system altogether. The Strickland Court holds that a financing statement can be effective to perfect the security interest even if the
clerks who file and search for the financing statement are misled by
the name designation.2 55 In the court's view, a prima facie comparison of the names establishes their similarity and the financing statement is "deemed" to be not misleading. 56 The Strickland Court ignores the fact that the searcher cannot personally thumb through the
filings.2 57 Instead Strickland presumes that when the searcher discovers the trade name filings, "Strickland Builders MFG Company"
and "Strickland Builders and Supply Company" the searcher would
recognize the similarity to "James T. Strickland," and be on notice
to inquire further. The court rejects the "exact name only" retrieval
system in place in the jurisdiction and ignores the fact that the disputed filings would not in fact be discovered. Moreover, the Strickland Court is untroubled by the fact that the trade names on the
financing statements were not even those used by the debtor, but
were variations of the trade name "Strickland Builders Supply." The
Strickland approach places potential creditors at serious risk of losing priority battles to undiscoverable prior creditors. While couched
in traditional language of "reasonably prudent search," the Strickland opinion in practical terms expands the searcher's obligation to
include a search of all the trade names and their variations. The
scope of this search exceeds even that of In re Glasco28 and In re
cent names from one day to the next.
253. See U.C.C. § 1-102 (1989); id. official comments 1 & 2.

254. Pongetti v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank (In re Strickland), 94 Bankr. 898 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1988).
255. Id. at 902-03.
256. See id. at 903.
257. See id. (stating that "when faced with determining whether a financing statement
which improperly names the debtor is misleading, a court must disregard the fact that a governmental employee may conduct the search on behalf of an interested creditor.").
258. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. Unit B
Apr. 1981).
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McBee,2 59 which demands a search of only one trade name under
special circumstances. This expanded burden arises in large part
from Strickland's intrusion into the non-judicial arena by imposing
additional filing and search obligations on clerks, and by its refusal
to consider actual administrative procedures. Strickland's rejection
of actual administrative procedures insults the executive branch and
destabilizes creditors' obligations and expectations.
Strickland ironically resembles Haley. 6 ' Haley invalidated a
filing on technical grounds even though its substantive purpose could
be achieved. Strickland validates a technically deficient filing even
though its substantive purpose is not achieved. The Strickland approach should be rejected as too extreme and as a misapplication of
the Section 9-402(8) standard because the substantive purpose of notice filing, and therefore of Section 9-402(8), is defeated.
4. Misidentification of the Debtor and Name Similarity.-The issue of name similarity intersects with issues of debtor
identity. The dominant test dictates the outcome of the dispute.
Where name similarity is the paramount criteria, the name of a natural person on the financing statement may be sufficient to perfect a
security interest in a corporation. 2 61 Name similarity may not be the
sole criteria, however. If the administrative system segregates personal and business names, the financing statement that incorrectly
omits corporate status will be seriously misleading despite name similarity. 6 2 If, however, emphasis is placed on the identity of the
debtor, the similarity between the true name and the name usd will
not justify the error as minor or not seriously misleading. For example, a financing statement that incorrectly names the partnership as
the debtor may not perfect a security interest in the corporate
debtor's collateral, even though the names of the partnership and the
corporation are virtually identical.263 On the other hand, an analysis
259.

National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316

(5th Cir. 1983).
260.

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143

(1952). For a discussion of Haley, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
261.

See, e.g., In re Hatfield Constr. Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 907 (M.D.

Ga. 1971) (holding that the name "Wayne L. Hatfield" was sufficient to perfect a security
interest in "Hatfield Construction Company").
262.

The name "Terry Pierson," may be virtually identical to "Terry Pierson, Inc." but

the former represents an individual whereas the latter identifies the corporation. See Bank of
Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. S.D. I11.
1988).

263. Dietrich-Post Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank of the North (In re McCauley's
Reprographics, Inc.), 638 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1981).
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that requires proper identification of the debtor focuses carefully on
the entire phrase in Section 9-402(1), which requests the "name of
the debtor." A "debtor" is the person legally responsible for the
debt.264 A name other than that of the person legally responsible for
the debt does not substantially comply with the requirements of Section 9-402(1). The error is the failure to properly identify the debtor
and is not minor. The error in other name similarity cases, by contrast, is in the misstatement of the debtor's name, and the extent of
such error is measured by the difference between the name used and
the correct name.
Debtor identification and name similarity issues may simultaneously arise in other configurations. For example, a financing statement filed against the sole shareholder instead of the corporate
debtor could be disqualified either by application of the name similarity test 265 or on the grounds that the debtor was the corporation,
not the shareholder.2 6 Failure to state a "sufficiently related" or
"substantially similar" name would constitute a seriously misleading
error under 9-402(8), resulting in a finding of legal insufficiency. Alternatively, in focusing on the identity of the debtor, failure to state
the name of the debtor required by 9-402(1) would be a failure to
substantially comply with requirements under 9-402(8).
A measure of uniform interpretation has evolved with respect to
financing statements that improperly provide the name of an individual instead of the name of the corporate debtor. Various theories
have been advanced to support the holding that such error is fatal to
264.

See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1989).

265. See, e.g., Goger v. United States (In re Janmar, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 4, 7-8 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1979). In Janmar,Julian Eady was President and sole shareholder of Janmar, Inc.
The defendant filed a financing statement against the corporate debtor under the name Julian

Eady. The Janmar court stated that "[w]hile courts have allowed some minor errors in the
debtor's name in both the financing statement and the indexing of it, 'the distinction drawn
...is whether the name as it appears on the financing statement is only slightly different than
the debtor's real name in which case parties searching the records would be placed on notice

by such entry.' " Id. at 8 (quoting In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 372 (M.D. Ga. 1973)). Thus,
the court held that the financing statement was insufficient to perfect defendant's security
interest, since "[t]he difficulty of finding a financing statement filed under 'Eady' while searching for a filing under 'J'
is clear." Id. The name used was not simialr to the debtor's legal
name, and a search in the debtor's legal name would not disclose the security interest.

266. In Janmar,the debtor was Janmar, Inc., and naming the debtor as Julian Eady on
the financing statement misidentified the debtor. Goger v. United States (In re Janmar, Inc.),
4 Bankr. 4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); see also In re Hinson & Hinson, Inc., 62 Bankr. 964, 968
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that a financing statement in the name of a natural person is
insufficient to provide notice of a security interest in corporate assets since a corporation is a
separate legal entity, which "has rights and obligations which do not inure to the individual.").
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the effectiveness of the financing statement in the absence of name
similarity. The corporation is a separate legal entity and filing
against corporate officers2 67 or stockholders 26 8 is not effective to perfect the security interest or is seriously misleading. 269 The name
given does not identify the person who is the debtor, and the financing statement therefore does not substantially comply with requirements. Taking these theories one step further the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held in In re Lintz West Side Lumber,
Inc.,270 that individuals and corporations are legally distinct entities
despite similarity in names; as such, even if a creditor did discover
the filings, the creditor would reasonably assume that corporate obligations are not those of individuals, and that the searcher would be
relieved of further inquiry. 271 Even if the corporate signature 27 2 or
address 27 3 properly appears on the financing statement, the error in
failing to state the debtor's name misidentifies the debtor and is seriously misleading. 7 4
In the converse situation, where the debtor is an individual, but
a corporate name is stated on the financing statement, the financing
statement has been held ineffective in the absence of similarity between the true name and the listed name on the grounds that either
267. See Janmar,4 Bankr. at 8; see also Brown v. Belarus Machinery Inc. (In re Service Lawn & Power, Inc.), 83 Bankr. 515, 520-21 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (holding that
financing statements filed against the president and secretary of a corporation where debtor
was the corporation were insufficient to perfect a security interest).
268. Limerick v. Limerick (In re Answerfone, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 24, 30 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1985) (holding that a financing statement naming the corporate shareholder of the debtor as
the debtor was insufficient to perfect a security interest in the debtor's assets).
269. See, e.g., In re My Place or Yours, Inc., 34 Bankr. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983);
see also Service Lawn & Power, 83 Bankr. at 515.
270. 655 F.2d 786, 791-92 (7th Cir. 1981).
271. Id. at 791 (holding that "[a] creditor would ordinarily, and could reasonably, assume that corporate assets would not be encumbered by a security interest filed under the
names of ... individuals despite the similarity in the names." (emphasis in original)).
272. See My Place or Yours, 34 Bankr. at 198 The financing statement was signed "My
Place or Yours, Inc., by Richard H. Storm," but named the debtor as "Rich Storm & Rob
Niebling d/b/a My Place or Yours." Id. at 197-98. Since the debtor was My Place or Yours,
Inc., the financing statement was held seriously misleading despite a proper signature. Id. at
198-99.
273. See, e.g., Bank of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84
Bankr. 533, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that even if the financing statement contained
the address of debtor's business location, a name other than the corporate debtor would cause
a search to fail to reveal the financing statement).
274. See, e.g., In re World Fin. Serv. Center, Inc., 78 Bankr. 239 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that where the business debtor's name was misstated and the address appeared to be
that of an individual's apartment, not a business address, the financing statement was seriously
misleading), affd, 860 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the corporation was not the owner of the collateral, 7 5 or that a creditor of an individual would not be alerted to check for a filing against
a corporation.278 Where the financing statement listed a corporate
debtor before it came into existence, 7 the court applied common
law principles of ratification to construe the financing statement as
having been properly executed. 7
Financing statements that are correct when filed may become
vulnerable to attack by virtue of post filing changes in the name or
structure of the debtor. In Warner/Elektra/AtlanticCorp. v. Sounds
DistributingCorp. (In re Sounds DistributingCorp.),279 the security
agreement was signed by an individual doing business under a trade
name and was filed as the financing statement. It became inaccurate
only after the debtor incorporated and adopted the former trade
name as the new corporate name. The Code then in existence did not
require refiling upon a seriously misleading change in name or business structure and the Sounds Court held that the filing was not
misleading.28 ° It may be that the original unamended filing in
275. Goger v. United States (In re Eady), 4 Bankr. I (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
276. See, e.g., Grant v. Citizens First Bank (In re Eisaman), 90 Bankr. 528, 531
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that "it could not be seriously argued that a hypothetical
creditor of [an individual] would be alerted to check for filing[s] against [a corporation].").
The Elsaman Court held that a financing statement filed against the corporation was ineffective to perfect a security interest in the individual principal's property. Id. Contra Lines v.
National Cash Register Co. (In re Green Mill Inn, Inc.), 474 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1973). In
Green Mill, the financing statement named the corporation's president as an individual debtor,
but was signed by the corporation (the true debtor). The court held that the financing statement was sufficient to perfect a security interest in the corporation's property, despite the
dissimilarity of name, because of California's cross-indexing procedures. The financing statement was cross-referenced by the corporate name noted in the signature. The filing could be
located under both the individual and corporate names, and thus "actual notice was. . . available to anyone interested in the filing." Id. at 15. The court held that "the defective, or ambiguous filing, aided by the probability of actual notice, substantially complied with the statutory
requirements, and thus preserved the security interest of the seller against rival creditors." Id.
277. The debtor, therefore, was technically an individual.
278. See John Deere Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 147 Ariz. 256, 709 P.2d 890 (Ct.
App. 1985); see also Turk v. Wright & Babcock, Ltd., 174 Il. App. 3d 139, 528 N.E.2d 993
(1988) (stating that a financing statement which misstated the corporate name was valid
where it also named an individual debtor who had signed in his capacity as corporate officer);
cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Zecher, 103 Misc. 2d 777, 426 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that the doctrine of defacto corporations applied to uphold a security agreement executed
prior to the time of filing of the certificate of incorporation and that the debtor was properly
identified on the financing statement).
279. 42 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1984).
280. Id. at 276. A discussion of name changes and the interplay between U.C.C. §§ 9402(7) and 9-306(2) is beyond the scope of this article. For in-depth discussions of the duty to
refile, see Burke, The Duty to Refile Under Section 9-402(7) of the Revised Article 9, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1083 (1980); McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 973-79; Westbrook, Glitch: Section 9-
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Sounds was not misleading because the trade and corporate names
were effectively identical 8 and may even have been cross-refer28 2
enced, thereby giving sufficient notice.
The balance between name similarity and debtor identification
has not been firmly established. Name similarity was more impor2 83 Aptant than debtor identification in In re Hatfield Construction.
plying In re Platt's name similarity test, 28 ' Hatfield held that the
name "Wayne L. Hatfield" on the financing statement was similar
enough to perfect a security interest in "Hatfield Construction Company." The court believed that in searching for "Hatfield Construction Company" a searcher would come across the filing for "Wayne
L. Hatfield," and that such discovery made the searcher responsible
for inquiring further whether the discovered filing against the individual was intended to represent a security interest in the debtor
corporation.
By contrast, Bank of Carbondalev. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re
Terry Pierson, Inc.)2 85 illustrates the importance of debtor identification and the limitations of the name similarity test in at least some
jurisdictions. In Pierson, a filing against "Terry Pierson" was ineffective to perfect a security interest in the debtor corporation "Terry
Pierson, Inc." even though the names were virtually identical and
the court stated that the applicable rules allowed for similar names
to be sufficient.2 86 The financing statement would not be revealed
402(7) and the U.C.C. Revision Process,52 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 408 (1984). For a discussion
on curing defective filings, see generally Frisch, supra note 29.
281. Sounds, 42 Bankr. at 276.
282. Although there was no discussion of cross-referencing procedures in Sounds, the
filing procedures of another county in the "same district included cross-referencing under both
names on the financing statement. See In re Hinson & Hinson, Inc., 62 Bankr. 964, 965
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). Compare Lines v. National Cash Register Co. (In re Green Mill Inn,
Inc.), 474 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a financing statement that incorrectly named
the debtor was sufficient to perfect a security interest where the financing statement had been
cross-referenced to allow actual notice to creditors) with Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v.
Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a financing statement which
misstated debtor's name was fatally defective where a hypothetical creditor would not have
discovered the filing by examining the notice index under the debtor's legal name). But see
Dietrich-Post Co. v. Alaska Nat'l Bank of the North (In re McCauley's Reprographics, Inc.),
638 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding the financing statement fatally defective, despite the
availability of actual notice, because the financing statement did not properly identify the
debtor as a corporation instead of as a partnership).
283. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 907 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
284. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
285. 84 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988).
286. Id. at 534.
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through a search because of the indexing method used in Illinois.287
According to the Affidavits issued by the Office of the Secretary of
State of Illinois, upon which the court heavily relied in Pierson,
searches in corporate debtor andindividual debtor names were mutually exclusive because the filing system segregated individual and
corporate filings.288 The Pierson Court did not compare the names to

one another in the abstract, but evaluated the name used on the financing statement in the context of the filing and search system.
Failure to discover the financing statement through a routine search
of the corporate debtor's name necessarily led to the conclusions that
the discrepancy between the names was seriously misleading and
that the secured party failed to fulfill the requirements of notice filing.289 The fact that corporate capacity appeared next to the signature and that the corporate address was listed did not cure the defect
of misidentifying the debtor. Identification by reference to the signature or mailing address presumes that one searching the records
would have had the opportunity to examine the financing statement.29 Since the financing statement was not found in Pierson,
nothing on the face of the financing statement could put the searcher
on notice of anything. 91
287. See infra note 288 and accompanying text (detailing the Illinois indexing method).
Although the result in Piersonwould appear to be precisely the same situation facing the court
in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952), which
was so vehemently rejected in U.C.C. § 9-402 official comment 9 (1989), one has only to refer
to the filing system to recognize that the outcome in Pierson was justified. For a more detailed
discussion of Haley, see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
288. Pierson, 84 Bankr. at 534 (noting that an affidavit of an employee of the Illinois
Secretary of State's Office stated that "[t]he UCC-financing statements filed in the name of
the individual Debtor will not appear on the corporate Debtor's search . . . . UCC-financing
statements filed in the name of the individual Debtor will not be revealed on a UCC-search of
a corporate Debtor, even if the only difference from the individual Debtor is an "Inc." after
the Debtor's name."). Even in an integrated system a standard search could dictate the same
result. A search for a corporate debtor under the letter "T" would not reveal the filing made
under the letter "P." For a description of a similar system in Florida, see Self, supra note 19.
289. Pierson, 84 Bankr. at 536.
290. Id.
291. Contra In re Nara Non-Food Distrib. Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 779, 322 N.Y.S.2d 194
(Sup. Ct. 1970), affd, 36 A.D.2d 796, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1971); In re Excel Stores, Inc.,
341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965); but see P.A.G. Garden Prairie, Inc. v. Central Wisconsin AG
Supply, Inc. (In re Central Wisconsin AG Supply, Inc.), 36 B.R. 908 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (holding that the omission of "Inc." from the name on the financing statement did not defeat
perfection). The Central Wisconsin Court observed that the debtor's name was a "decidedly
uncommon business name" and that any creditor with a "modicum of concern" for his own
welfare would investigate whether the filing in question referred to the debtor under review.
Central Wisconsin, 36 B.R. at 913. The filing system in Wyoming is fully integrated and
totally alphabetical, which would tend to minimize the risk of non-discovery by omission of a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss2/3

60

Zekan: The Name Game--Playing to Win Under § 9-402 of the Uniform Commer

1990]

THE NAME GAME

The analytical approach of the Pierson Court is instructive. The
court first applied the Illinois statute and Official Comments to determine the requirements of the Code and to establish the defect in
the financing statement. 2 Upon concluding that a defect existed,
the court then considered whether the financing statement could be
saved through application of § 9-402(8). According to Pierson, substantial compliance with § 9-402(1) requires the financing statement
to "provide enough information to alert an interested party of a possible prior security interest in that collateral. '293 Resolution of this
issue necessarily required a discussion of the Illinois administrative
system to determine whether the financing statement could functionally provide notice of a potential security interest in the debtor's assets. This, of course, mandates discovery of the financing statement
through the course of a routine search conducted in the legal name
of the debtor.294
Even the Pierson Court could not escape the circular reasoning
of Section 9-402. The significance of the error hinged upon the
"findability" of the financing statement in the context of the indexing system actually used in the jurisdiction. The focus was not so
much on the similarity between the name used and the debtor's legal
name, but on the effect of the dissimilarity. If the error did not interfere with the search or retrieval of the financing statement it would
constitute a minor error that was not seriously misleading. If the
error had destroyed findability, the error was not minor and was seriously misleading. Unless the financing statement is actually discoverable, further analysis is precluded. If the financing statement cannot
be found, there is no reason for a reasonably prudent creditor to investigate further. But if the defective financing statement survives
the first tier of the court's analysis, discoverability may proceed to
the second tier regarding the quality and extent of the defect in the
debtor's name.
Resolution of the substantial compliance question necessitates
corporate suffix. Telephone interview with U.C.C. filing officer, Sec. of the State's Office,
Cheyenne, Wyoming (July 27, 1988).

292. See Bank of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84
Bankr. 533, 534 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1988). Unlike the official version of the Code comments,
which are silent, the Illinois comment to § 9-402(7) specifically requires the use of the corporate name on a financing statement. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-402(7) comment 7 (SmithHurd 1974) (stating that "[w]here the debtor is incorporated, the name of the corporation
should always be used in the financing statement.").
293. Pierson, 84 Bankr. at 535.
294.

Id.
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discussion of the effect of the error within the context of the administrative system. The degree of error depends upon the search results;
the search results dictate whether the financing statement substantially complies. First, the financing statement must actually be discoverable; only then may due consideration be given to the extent of
the error. This analysis is in sharp contrast to those which simply
compare, in isolation, the name used with the legal name without
investigation of the consequences of a search within the system in
operation.
5. Name Similarity: Benefits to Listing.-Secured parties
have benefitted from listing the trade name as well as the debtor's
legal name on the financing statement, as illustrated by Lieberman
Music Co. v. Hagen."9 5 In Lieberman, Fargo National Bank and
Lieberman Music Co. both filed financing statements listing the
debtor as "Vernon Hagen, d/b/a Wilder Than Ever."29 At the time
of Fargo's filing, the debtor was an individual transacting business as
a sole proprietor under a trade name, and the filing was therefore
effective to perfect Fargo's security interest. However, before Lieberman filed its financing statement, Hagen had incorporated his business.21 7 The new corporate name, "Wilder Than Ever, Inc." added
only a corporate suffix to the former trade name.2 98 The court applied Section 9-402(7), since Fargo's financing statement was correct
when filed.299
Awarding paramount priority to Fargo, the court explained that
Fargo's financing statement did not become seriously misleading because "a search under the debtor's true name would reveal the filing
and . . . the financing statement, once found, would reveal the correct identity of the debtor."300 The court further explained that Lieberman knew the trade name and that Fargo's filing under this name
did not conceal the existence of its security interest.301 In other
295.

394 N.W.2d 837 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

296. Id. at 839.
297. Id. at 838-39. The court did not discuss whether Lieberman, having identified the
debtor incorrectly as an individual instead of as a corporation, was thereby precluded from
attaining perfected status.
298. The bank subsequently perfected its security interest by filing financing statements
which listed the corporation as the debtor. Id. at 839.
299. This was not a defective trade name filing case, which ordinarily leads to a discussion of the substantial compliance provision. Rather, the filing was correct when made, but the
fact that the trade name was listed enabled the initial filing to remain effective and not become
seriously misleading.
300. Lieberman Music Co. v. Hagen, 394 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
301. Id. at 840-41.
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words, a search under the corporate name would reveal the financing
statement that had been cross-indexed under the trade name, and
having discovered the filing, a searcher would be led to discover the
metamorphosis of the debtor, and hence, its true identity.302 Thus,
the fact that the secured party had listed the trade name, though
optional, served to protect the perfected status of the interest even
though the debtor changed its structure from sole proprietorship to
corporate status.
Filing procedures did make a difference in the determination
that the financing statement was not seriously misleading, 03 even
though following incorporation the secured party did not file any
amendment or new financing statement. A search in the name of the
corporate debtor revealed the financing statement because the original financing statement had been cross-indexed under the trade
name as well.as the individual's name. The Lieberman Court then
applied the tests articulated in Dietrich-PostCo. v. Alaska National
304
Bank of the North (In re McCauley's Reprographics, Inc.):
Would a search under the debtor's true name reveal the filing, and
once found, would the financing statement reveal the correct identity
of the debtor. The financing statement thus found would indicate a
sole proprietorship doing business under a trade name. The debtor's
true name and corporate identity could then be revealed through further inquiry.
6. Result-Dictated Decisions.-Some courts tend to favor one
class of claimant over another and orient their analysis to bring,
about results reflecting that preference. The flaw in such a resultdictated approach 30 5 is that the analysis is skewed to determine,
from post hoc events, the legal significance of an earlier transaction
- the filing of the financing statement. The legal sufficiency of a
financing statement should be determined as of the time the earlier
transaction occurred. Where secured creditors are favored over trust302. Although not explicitly part of the opinion, it is a necessary inference that the
financing statement in the name of the individual debtor had been cross-indexed under the
trade name, because only by a reference under the trade name would a searcher have been
able to locate the financing statement when searching under the corporate debtor's name. A
search under the corporate name "Wilder Than Ever, Inc." would not have led to the filing if
indexed only under the debtor's name "Hagen."
303.
304.
305.

Lieberman, 394 N.W.2d at 840-41.
638 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1981).
To some degree all decisions are result-oriented. A result-dictated decision is one in

which the analysis is contrived to produce a particular result as opposed to an analysis in
which the result is unknown in advance.
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ees in bankruptcy, the result dictated approach makes the filing of
bankruptcy a critical factor in determining legal sufficiency of the
financing statement, since it is at that point in time that a trustee's
claim is fixed and represents a challenge to the secured party.306
Courts may justify preferential treatment of secured parties on the
theory that the secured party has given value and the trustee has
not, or that the trustee was not misled, or that no one was misled by
the error in the debtor's name. 0 However, if a financing statement
cannot be found, it is possible that an unsecured creditor, whom the
trustee represents, may have relied on its absence to extend unsecured credit, or may have expected equal treatment with all other
creditors. A post hoc decision permitting a previously undisclosed
claim to take priority in the debtor's assets over a trustee's claim
would defeat an expectation of equality that an unsecured creditor
may have had.
In Stafford v. Admiral Credit Corp.,308 decided under the former Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 09 the court held that a trustee
could not use defects in the filing to circumvent an earlier creditor's
lien, especially where there was "no showing that anyone was actually harmed or misled" to any extent by the defect.310 The court did
not want to create a windfall to non-injured persons, the trustee, at
the expense of the earlier creditor and, therefore, upheld the validity
of the defective instrument. 1 But creditors who rely on the record
may be misled by the result, or the absence of a filing, whether they
are themselves secured or unsecured.
Occasionally, decisions favor a particular claimant, impose a
test of actual harm and retrospectively burden the subsequent creditor with expanded search obligations. A remarkable statement by the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Peoples National Bank v.
Uhlenhake31 2 illustrates this point: "As to any other party, Boecking's security interest might not be perfected. As to Bank, however,
306.

See, e.g., Stafford v. Admiral Credit Corp., 280 F. Supp. 818 (M.D.N.C. 1968).

307. Id. at 821.
308.

280 F. Supp. 818 (M.D.N.C. 1968).

309. The trust receipts financing statement was the pre-Code equivalent of a financing
statement with respect to inventory financing transactions.
310.

Stafford, 280 F. Supp. at 821.

311. The Stafford Court construed two trust receipt financing statements together to
find all the requisite elements, approved a typed signature and did not directly discuss the
name problem at all, beyond pointing out that the debtor was listed as Pete Knight, Inc.,
instead of its true corporate name Pete Knight Television & Appliance, Inc. Id. at 819.
312.

712- P.2d 75 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985).
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equity demands a different result."31 3 Whereas the financing statement might have been insufficient with respect to other creditors, it
was held sufficient vis-a-vis the bank. The court held that, due to the
bank's knowledge of the debtor's trade name, the bank was estopped
from asserting that a financing statement filed in the trade name was
improper. 14
The court, however, viewed the knowledge of Peoples National
Bank, a subsequent creditor, as a critical factor in determining
whether an earlier creditor's financing statement, which was filed in
the debtor's trade name, would take priority. This analysis made the
legal effectiveness of a financing statement depend upon events that
occurred subsequent to filing. This also suggests that the test for
measuring the gravity of an error is dependent upon actual results--did the financing statement actually mislead a subsequent
creditor. This analysis would create an anomaly in situations where
the subsequent creditor is a trustee in bankruptcy, who is a hypothetical lien creditor without knowledge. In conflicts with the trustee, it is not necessary to show that anyone was actually misled. The
test applied in Uhlenhake could support a contrary result. The
Uhlenhake Court held that because the bank had knowledge of the
trade name, it should have searched that trade name and discovered
the claim of the earlier creditor, Boecking Machinery, Inc. This is
contrary to commercial practice. Although the bank had knowledge
of the trade name, it reasonably expected that a creditor would only
file in its actual name.316 The fact that the bank declined to search
in the trade name and, rather, searched the records under the name
it reasonably expected was required, suggests that the bank was misled by the trade name filing.
Had the Uhlenhake Court utilized a more standard approach by
first evaluating the existence of each party's respective security inter313.

Id. at 77. Uhlenhake involved a suit initiated by Peoples National Bank to collect

money due on promissory notes signed by Uhlenhake as Chairman of the Board of Kurb Services, Inc. and to foreclose on some collateral securing the notes. Approximately five months
before the bank entered into this arrangement and filed its financing statement Kurb Services,
Inc., the defendant L.E. Uhlenhake, d/b/a Bud's Construction Co., entered into an installment
sales security agreement with the creditor Boecking Machinery, Inc., who was granted a security interest in the same collateral. Boecking's financing statement was filed in the debtor's
trade name. When the debtor Uhlenhake defaulted in payments to Boecking and Kurb Services, Inc. defaulted in payments to the bank, this action arose to determine the priority between the security interests of the bank and Boecking Machinery, Inc. Id. at 76-77.
314. Id.
315. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1990).
316. Uhlenhake, 712 P.2d at 77.
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est, and then addressing the priority issue, it would have arrived at
the same result, but through a more defensible analysis. The debtor
listed on the bank's financing statement, Kurb Services, Inc., did not
actually have rights in the collateral because the Bank's expectation
that the individual, Uhlenhake, was donating the equipment to his
corporation Kurb Services, Inc. was not fulfilled.3 1 Upon proof that
the bank's security interest did not attach, Boecking could assert
that it's security interest was the first to attach in the collateral and,
therefore, could establish priority pursuant to Section 9-312(5)(b). 18
Instead of pursuing this analysis, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals addressed perfection first instead of attachment and considered
it unnecessary to address the nature of the bank's security interest if
Boecking's security interest was perfected. A necessary ingredient to
perfection is attachment,"1 and this status should not have been
taken for granted. The court, by applying a standard analysis of the
creation, perfection, and priority of potentially conflicting security
interests, would have reached the same result without unnecessarily
expanding search obligations or inserting actual knowledge into the
test for seriously misleading error.
7. The Third Category: The Second Tier Test, Seriously Misleading Errors, and Modern Approaches.-In re Terry Pierson,
Inc.32 ° and In re Waters3 21 illustrate modern approachs in resolving
variant name filings. Rejecting the name comparison approach, the
Waters analysis included consideration of "the operation of the
U.C.C. indexing system [in the relevant state and county], including
the size of the index and the distinctiveness of the names involved. '3 22 Suggesting that the file box method, whereby a searcher

"riffles" through the drawer full of cards, is nearly obsolete, the Waters Court recognized the demands for greater precision in the computer system. 23 In view of the technological advances made over
317.

See id. (noting that although the trial court determined that the Bank's security

interest did not attach because Kurb Services, Inc. lacked an ownership interest in the collateral, the court of appeals would only address the priority issue); see also U.C.C. § 9-203
(1989) (setting forth the requirements necessary for a security interest to "attach").
318. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1989) (providing that "[s]o long as conflicting security interests [in the same collateral] are unperfected, the first to attach has priority.").

319. See U.C.C. § 9-303 (1989).
320. Bank of Carbondale v. Terry Pierson, Inc. (In re Terry Pierson, Inc.), 84 Bankr.
533 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988); see supra notes 285-94 and accompanying text.
321. 90 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
322. Id. at 960 (stating also that "[tihe resolution of the 'seriously misleading' question
requires more than just the comparison of two names.").
323. Id.
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previous systems, the "identical name" standard is becoming a necessity. "A clear trend . . . is to require greater precision in listing
the name of the debtor on a financing statement. That trend likely
results from the increased reliance upon computers in filing and indexing financing statements. ' 24 In Waters, three brothers operated
a farm as a partnership. 25 When the lender filed a security agreement as a financing statement, it named each of the three individual
partners, but not the partnership, as the debtor.3 28 The court expressed strong doubts that a computer search in the partnership
name would reveal the filing against the brothers and their wives; it
concluded, however, that even if a search did generate the documents, the financing statement was seriously misleading because a
prudent creditor would be justified in concluding that only personal
assets had been pledged.327 The identification of the debtor was,
therefore, a more influential criterion than the name similarity.
Where the name of the debtor was listed on another security agreement filed as a financing statement as "Waters Bros." instead of
"Waters Brothers Partnership," the court held that no one could be
misled by the omission of the word "Partnership. 3 28 Abbreviations,
therefore, appear acceptable, at least where they are in standard
form.
Many cases have cited Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce
(Henry House Packing Co.)329 for the principle that: "The issue to
be determined is not the true name of the entity, but whether the
filing was misleading. Filing under an assumed trade name is effective unless it is misleading."330 This implies that a name other than
the legal name would satisfy the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-402.
But the opinion of the circuit court in the context of the facts of
Henry House does not necessarily support such a sweeping
generalization.
The Washington enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code
took effect on July 1, 1967. In anticipation of the new Code law,
documentation of the credit transaction was prepared in June,
324.

Id. at 961.

325. Id. at 951, 956.
326. Id. at 952 (stating that a UCC-1 financing statement filed on Nov. 14, 1980 listed
the debtors as: Waters, George & Teresa; Waters, Lyle & Lisa Baum; Waters, Glen & Lori).
327. Id. at 961.
328. Id.
329. 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975).
330. Id. at 1012.
331. Id. at 1010; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.10-101 (1966).
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1967.32 The debtor, Empire Packing Co. was merged into Henry
House Packing Co., Inc. on June 26, 1967. aa3 The surviving corporation was Empire, but the name was to be changed to Henry House
Packing Co., Inc. as soon as possible. 3 4 In anticipation of the merger
and name change, the National Bank of Commerce of Seattle prefiled a financing statement in the name of Henry House Packing Co.,
Inc. on June 15, and on June 30 entered into security agreements
with the surviving corporation, under the new name, Henry
House. 3 The Secretary of State of Washington certified that the
name was changed on June 26, 1967, although the necessary articles
of amendment had not been filed with the state. 3 6 While the security agreements were executed by the debtor after the merger, the
financing statements were filed prior to the merger; the trustee challenged the financing statements as having been executed by a company that did not survive the merger and as being "technically in the
wrong name. 337 The trustee argued that, despite issuance of the
State certification of the name change and despite the fact that the
Secretary of State's records reflected the name change from Empire
to Henry House, a filing under the name Henry House was "technically wrong" because the technical name remained Empire until articles of amendment were submitted to the Secretary of State.3 8 The
district court held that the true name of the surviving corporation
was Henry House, and awarded judgment to the bank. 3 9
According to the circuit court, the problem with using the
"true" name test to determine whether the bank had perfected its
security interest was that both perfection and priority would "turn
on a mistake of the Secretary of State" instead of on the effectiveness of the financing statement itself.3 40 The error of the Secretary of
State was the subject of another legal proceeding, in which a court
order was sought to authorize the Secretary of State to correct its
records.34 1 The state court prohibited back-dating, and ordered the
correction and full record of the error and correction to be main332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Siljeg, 509 F.2d at 1010.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1011.
Id.
Id. (the district court case is unreported).
Id. at 1011-12.
See Pacific Nat'1 Bank v. Kramer, 77 Wash. 2d 899, 468 P.2d 436 (1970).
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tained. The state court declined, however, to evaluate the effect of
the error on the rights and priorities of the various claimants, leaving
the matter explicitly for determination by the district court and the
referee in bankruptcy. 42 The circuit court concluded that the district
court had applied "the wrong legal test" because it "never found
whether there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
Section 9-402. ' 's4 The proper legal standard to apply was whether
the financing statement substantially complied with requirements of
9-402, and whether the error, if any, was seriously misleadSection
ing. 44 If the issue were whether the debtor's true name was used,
the determination would depend upon whether the Secretary of State
had made an error by issuing a certificate without having received
the proper documentation. The error of the secured party was not
the use of the name "Henry House Packing Company, Inc.," but the
failure to submit amended articles to the Office of the Secretary of
State evidencing corporate action to change the name.3 45 The surviving corporation carried on business as Henry House Packing Co.,
Inc. a46 The Henry House Court focused on commercial realities and
found that all parties, including subsequent searchers, would regard
the post-merger corporation to be "Henry House," and the articles
technically validating the debtor's name were finally filed in November, five months later. The circuit court considered it likely that only
that one name was used and "it may well be that a filing under that
name was not seriously misleading. 3 47 The court's rejection of the
"true name" test did not reject the true name of the debtor as a
legal requirement, it rejected the use of a technicality to defeat an
otherwise valid filing in the name actually regarded by all as the
debtor's true legal name.
III.

WOMEN DEBTORS

Occasionally, perceptions of women affect the transaction or the
342.
343.
1013 (9th
344.

345.

Id. at 903, 468 P.2d at 438.
Siljeg v. National Bank of Commerce (Henry House Packing Co.), 509 F.2d 1009,
Cir. 1975).
See id.

Failure to use the anticipated name could itself have been determined to be seri-

ously misleading, as was the case in Burnett v. H.O.U. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo), 503 F.2d
1218 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that a secured creditor who knew that the debtor was contem-

plating changing its name and nevertheless proceeds to extend credit without providing notice
of the name change, misled and deceived other potential creditors).
346. Sljeg, 509 F.2d at 1013.
347. Id.
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decision. In Borg Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Secretary of State,4 8
the First National Bank of Hillsboro correctly listed the debtors
under their legal names, Paul Eugene Talley and Twila J. Talley,
and also listed the trade name, misspelled, as Empira Manufacturing
Co., instead of Empire Manufacturing Co.149 In response to several
search requests by the subsequent secured party, Borg Warner, over
a span of six years, the Secretary of State's Office failed to produce
an& financing statement against the debtors.350 Each request properly identified the wife aid business trade name, but incorrectly
stated the name of the husband.351 In response to a request that correctly stated the name of the husband, however, the Secretary's office did disclose the Hillsboro financing statement.3 52 The fact that
disclosure was made only when the name of the husband was listed
correctly suggests that only the husband's name mattered to the filing clerk. If the financing statement had been properly indexed and
searched under the wife's name as well as the husband's, the disclosure would have been made. 353 The court held that the Twila filing
should have been found, and that the state was negligent in failing to
disclose the financing statements on record.354
In Citizens State Bank v. Davison (In re Davison),55 the secured party neglected to obtain the signature of the debtor who had
an ownership interest in the collateral, believing that the signature of
the husband alone was sufficient. Although the Missouri statute requires that the debtor sign the financing statement, which would
therefore require the signature of the wife, the court held that the
husband's signature satisfied the requirement if the husband acted as
an agent for the wife. 5 '
348. 240 Kan. 598, 731 P.2d 301 (1987).
349. Id. at 600, 731 P.2d at 303.
350. See id. at 600-01, 731 P.2d at 303-04.
351.

Id.

352. Id. at 601-02, 731 P.2d at 304.
353. The filing supervisor in charge of U.C.C. filings testified that the financing statement should have been cross-indexed under the individual debtors, and that in looking for
Twila Talley the clerk should have discovered the Hillsboro financing statement. Id. at 603,
731 P.2d at 305. If the wife is a debtor, therefore, a separate financing statement should be
filed, unless the mandatory practice of the Secretary's office is to cross-index against both
names. See also Walker v. Tennessee State Bank (In re Williams), 112 Bankr. 913 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1990).
354. Borg Warner, 240 Kan. at 604-05, 731 P.2d at 305 (holding that because of the
searcher's reliance on the state's certificates, the negligence of the employees of the Secretary

of State proximately caused Borg Warner's damages).
355. 75 Bankr. 738, 739 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
356. Id. at 741-42.
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In Barton v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. (In re Skinner),3 5 7 the
listing of the wife's name was mere surplusage but, as the second
name listed, did not interfere with the notice function. In Walker v.
Tennessee State Bank (In re Williams),a58 the debtor, Anne Marie
Williams, operated her business as a sole proprietorship. Nevertheless, the secured party listed the name of the husband first on the
financing statement, followed by the wife's name and then the trade
name. 359 A search in the debtor's name was unsuccessful because, in
accordance with procedure, the filing clerk filed only under the first
name listed which was the husband's name. The court nevertheless
held that the financing statement satisfied the Code's filing requirements, thereby excusing the secured party's error in preparing the
financing statement.3 60 The court determined that the filing clerk
should have rejected the financing statement or filed under all of the
names listed under the financing statement.3 61 The court could have
legitimately relied on Code requirements to discourage the practice
of naming the husband first, at least where the husband was not even
a debtor. Intent on saving the secured party's financing statement,
however, the court may have overstepped judicial boundaries by imposing additional administrative procedures on the filing officer.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Much of the difficulty in interpreting Section 9-402(8) stems
from the tautological nature of its provisions. With respect to the
identification of the debtor on the financing statement, substantial
compliance depends in part upon the classification and gravity of the
error. Even though a financing statement may facially appear to
comply with requirements, the informational content may defeat the
underlying objectives of the requirements. Failure to meet the objectives calls into question whether there has in fact been substantial
compliance. In this circular structure it has been difficult to establish
a straightforward test. 62
The test for substantial compliance with Code requirements set
357.
358.

22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1286 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
112 Bankr. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1990).

359.

Id. at 914 (noting that the names were not listed alphabetically, but as follows:

"Williams, J. Malone, Williams, Ann Marie, DBA Jabo's Pharmacy #2").

360. Id. at 916-17.
361. Id.
362. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) may be linearly applied to the other requirements in a two stage
process because a defect in any of the other functions may result in lack of notice as to particular collateral or other information, but there is not a failure of notice altogether.
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forth in Section 9-402(8) appears to invite an evaluation of the error
and of the financing statement within the context of its causal effect.
If the effect of the error is a tendency to seriously mislead, the financing statement is not effective. Reconciliation of these two standards is possible if the Section 9-402(8) test is bifurcated into two
stages or tiers. In the first tier, a determination must be made
whether the financing statement has substantially complied with
Code requirements. This decision is guided by comparing the information on the financing statement with the information required
under § 9-402(1). If the financing statement does not substantially
comply with the Code requirements of Section 9-402(1), there can
be no consideration of the gravity or consequence of any alleged defects in the financing statement. If the financing statement does substantially comply because the information required has been supplied, then the analysis progresses to the second tier to determine the
gravity and consequences of the alleged defect. An evaluation is
made only in those cases where substantial compliance has been
achieved.
This two-tier, functional approach to applying the requirements
of Section 9-402 is becoming increasingly consistent with a strict
construction of the name of the debtor requirement. Now more than
ever, inaccuracies in stating the debtor's name, or in selecting a
name other than thb debtor's legal name, jeopardize the ability of a
searching party to locate the filing. Absent discovery of the financing
statement, notice of the security interest that may exist in the collateral is impossible.3 3 Therefore, a functional approach to the requirements of Section 9-402(1) with respect to its key feature-the name
of the debtor--demands a literal, or strict reading in order to resolve
the tautology. Section 9-402(8), as a redemptive provision, attempted to prevent hypertechnicalities from interfering with the efficient operation of the notice system; instead, it has compounded the
problems of interpreting the legal requirements. If a financing statement can achieve its objective of providing notice to a subsequent
searcher of the existence of a security interest in the debtor's collateral, then trivial defects in form should not be used to defeat the
earlier creditor's superior status. But if a facially trivial defect
defeats the objective, then a financing statement should not be. said
363. Non-compliance with the requirements for other information on the UCC-l form
does not jeopardize discovery of the financing statement, and since the purpose of notice is
fulfilled, a more liberal, or lenient, application of Section 9-402(8) in those cases may be
appropriate.
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to substantially comply with requirements.
To render a financing statement in substantial compliance with
requirements, even though the underlying purpose would be frustrated, would elevate form over substance. That would be contrary to
the spirit of the Code and in direct conflict with the purpose of Section 9-402(8). Since the present Code does not explicitly require the
exclusive use of the debtor's legal name as the identifier on the financing statement, the two-tier analysis should be engaged.
If the legal name were required under § 9-402(1), one could
legitimately argue that there is no substantial compliance, unless the
legal name of the debtor was provided, and therefore basic Code requirements have not been met. If there is not substantial compliance,
the remaining tests of Section 9-402(8) need not even be addressed;
a discussion of the gravity and effect of the error is rendered moot by
the decision of no substantial compliance.
The name of the debtor on the financing statement demands
special attention because of its unique function. Errors in the general
contents of a financing statement may be rectified through a
searcher's intervention, who may discover the true state of affairs
through further inquiry. But an error in the name of the debtor may
preclude discovery of the financing statement altogether because the
debtor's name is the key to filing and retrieval of the financing statement. Without discovery of the financing statement there is no
awareness of a prior interest or of any error, and further inquiry is,
in any event, not possible. The searcher is foreclosed from the opportunity to rectify any error in the debtor's name if the error precluded
discovery of the financing statement in the first place. Tolerance for
error in the debtor's name should be limited to situations in which
the error does not interfere with the discoverability of the financing
statement during the course of a routine search of the records.
The modern approach to Section 9-402(8) rejects ad hoc decision making in favor of a mature legal analysis of the complex mosaic of law and fact attending debtor name issues. Analysis of the
variety of approaches confirms the wisdom of applying a single unified approach to all debtor name issues, as suggested below. The
standard of review in Section 9-402(8) calls for a two-tier analysis to
determine, initially, whether the financing statement substantially
complies with the requirements of Section 9-402; and secondly,
whether any error in the name of the debtor is minor and not seriously misleading. The substantial compliance test is satisfied 'with an
objective review of the financing statement against the statutory re-
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quirements. If the financing statement is not disqualified after the
initial stage of the analysis, the gravity of any error in the debtor's
name should be assessed in the second stage by reference to the effectiveness in achieving its essential purpose; providing notice. The
analysis must depart from the past practice of presuming discovery
of the financing statement. Instead, the analysis should include an
evaluation of the probability or actuality of discovery within the context of the system in operation (manual or electronic), the administrative practices in filing and searching, and office procedures. The
burden of proving that the error is minor and not seriously misleading should rest upon the secured party relying upon the filing, as
provided in Section 9-402(8). The approach most compatible with
preserving the reliability of the notice filing system and with providing the maximum fairness to all participants in the system is one
that reviews the facts from the perspective of the subsequent searching creditor. This modem approach for interpreting Section 9-402(8)
with respect to debtor name issues is mature enough to reach consensus on the law and flexible enough to accommodate all of the relevant facts.
The judiciary plays a pivotal role in modernizing commercial
law through its interpretation of key provisions such as Section 9402 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In addition, legislators have
the power to reduce litigation through appropriate revisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code of their respective states and to inform
participants of their respective obligations without having to resort to
hindsight analysis. Administrators may also contribute through the
broad authorities granted to the Secretaries of State to implement
the intent of Section 9-402.
The following recommendations are offered to streamline analysis, minimize the frequency of future debtor name errors, and clarify
legal responsibilities. They are offered in the hope of improving the
reliability and efficiency of the system, and of increasing the
probability of a win-win situation for all.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Essentially five avenues of reform can be pursued to prevent the
further erosion of the notice filing system of the Uniform Commercial Code. The-five specific recommendations that follow are summarized in general terms below.
1. Legislative reform of Section 9-402(1), (3), (7), of the Official Comments to Section 9-402(8), and of Sections 9-402(4), (7)
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and 9-105(1)(j) will more permanently reinforce the integrity of the
notice filing system and provide a more uniform basis for statutory
provisions.
2. Revisions to the Official Comments will explain the purpose
to the reforms and assist interested parties in becoming informed of
their respective legal obligations under the Uniform Commercial
Code.
3. Administrative measures should be taken to prevent problems
from arising in the first instance, and to implement the legislative
reforms. Even in the absence of legislative reform, certain administrative measures are authorized by the existing U.C.C. and in some
states are already supplemented by further powers granted under
Administrative Procedures Acts.
4. Judicial adoption of a uniform approach to the problems arising under Section 9-402 should be encouraged. A two-tier analysis
would be most consistent with the principles articulated in the Code
and is specifically described in Recommendation Four herein.3 e '
5. Finally, in Recommendation Five, some suggestions are offered for coping with Section 9-402 problems in the current uncertain judicial climate pending legislative reform.
The fact that some courts have developed rules to cope with the
interpretation of the requirements of Section 9-402 does not obviate
the need for statutory reform. Such rules have not been adopted
unanimously, nor even by a clear majority of courts facing the issue
of variant name filings. Such rules do not give adequate guidelines
with respect to "similar" names, nor do they even suggest whether
different approaches might be appropriate in light of manual or electronic filing and retrieval systems. Finally, to the extent such rules
have been adopted by some courts they are subject to review and
reconsideration by decisions which reflect positions contrary to these
rules.36 5 Until these rules have been formalized by statute, they are
subject to continuing attack and inconsistent application.
A.

Recommendation One: Statutory Reform

The Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code should be
364. See infra pp. 444-45.
365. For example, due to the Ninth Circuit's decision in SilIjeg v. National Bank of
Commerce (Henry House Packing Co.), 509 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1975), the bankruptcy court
in In re Wilhoit was urged to reconsider its decision regarding trade name filings as seriously
misleading and invalid. Carter v. Greene County Bank (In re Wilhoit), 6 Bankr. 574, 575
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
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revised to read along the following lines:
Section 9-402(1): A financing statement need not set forth the entire agreement of the parties, and is sufficient if it contains the following required information. The legal name of the debtor and the
legal name of the secured party shall be provided in the spaces
designated therein on the financing statement. A financing statement shall also include the signature of the debtor, an address of
the secured party from which information concerning the security
interest may be obtained, a mailing address of the debtor, and a
statement describing the items or indicating the types of collateral.
[No changes to the remaining portion of Section 9-402(1) are recommended at this time.]
The proposed revision would replace the first sentence of Section 9-402(1) of the 1989 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which currently reads:
Section 9-402(1): A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the
names of the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor,
gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types,
or describing the items, of collateral. 866
Conforming changes will be necessary to other provisions of Article 9 for the sake of clarification, consistency, and effective implementation of the amendments to Section 9-402(1). Included among
the conforming amendments are the following (proposed revisions
are italicized):
Section 9-402(3): A form substantially as follows is sufficient to
comply with subsection (1):
Legal Name of debtor (or assignor) .
Address . ...

...

Federal Identification Number (Social
Security or Tax Id) of debtor
Trade Name of debtor (or assignor)[optional].
Legal Name of secured party (or assignee) . ...

...

Address
[No changes would be made to the remaining portion of Section 9-402(3) by the proposed revision.]
Section 9-402(7): A financing statement sufficiently shows the le366. U.C.C. § 9-402(l) (1989).
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gal name of the debtor if it gives the individual, partnership or
corporate name of the debtor as it appears on the official documents (showing birth, registration or certificate of incorporation,
respectively, and as officially modified or amended), whether or
not it adds other trade names or names of partners. [Possible
changes to the remaining portion of Section 9-402(7) are beyond
the scope of this Article.]
A new subsection, Section 9-105(1)(j), would be added to define
the term "Legal name," and the subsections following the definition
would be relettered:
Section 9-105(1)(j): "Legal name" means the official name (appellation) of an individual, partnership, or corporation as stated on
an official document such as the birth certificate, passport, registration, or certificate of incorporation,respectively, and as modified, supplemented or amended of record with the appropriatejudicial or other governmental authorities.
Corresponding changes should be made to Sections 9-403(4)
and 9-403(7) with respect to the filing officer's duties to index the
statements according to the legal name of the debtor, and with respect to fixture filings, under the legal name of the secured party.
B. Recommendation Two: Revisions to Official Comments
The Official Comments to Section 9-402 should be supplemented with an explanation of the revisions (proposed revisions are
italicized).
Official Comment 1 to § 9-402 should be revised as follows:
1. Subsection (1) sets out the simple formal requisites of a
financing statement under this Article. These requirements are: (1)
identificationof the debtor by the legal name; (2) signature of the
debtor; (3) addresses of both parties; (4) a description of the collateral by type or item. The identity of the debtor must be established by reference to the debtor's legal name in order to provide
systematic and effective notice of a potential security interest in
the debtor's assets and to simplify the filing and retrievalprocess
in accomplishing that goal.[No changes would be made to the remaining portions of comment 1.]
Official Comment 7 to Section 9-402 should refer to the changes
in Subsection (7) and to the new Section 9-105(1)(j). It should also
explain that the controlling date for determining the legal name of
the debtor should be the date of filing of the financing statement and
any continuation statement. Suggested language to this effect is indi-
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cated by italics:
7. Subsection (7) undertakes to deal with some of the
problems as to who is the debtor and what is the debtor's legal

name. [The remaining portion of the first paragraph should remain
unchanged but at the end of the first paragraph, add:] The "legal
name" of the debtor is defined in Sections 9-105(1)(j) and 9105(J)(d). With respect to afinancing statement, the legal name is
the legal name of the debtor in effect on the date of filing the
financing statement, and if applicable, any continuationstatement.

[The remaining portion of comment 7 should remain unchanged.]
Official Comment 9 to Section 9-402 should be supplemented
with an admonition that although subsection (8) was designed to
"discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of.

.

. stat-

utory requirements" it should not be used to defeat notice. To that
end, the following should be added to Official Comment 9:
9. [At the end of comment 9 add:] This provision should not,
however, be used to defeat the accomplishment of notice. Errors
which appear to be minor upon preparationof the financing statement but which in practice interfere with the systematic filing or
retrieval of the financingstatement during a routine search of the
record are not minor errors and are seriously misleading. The use
of a name other than the legal name of the debtor is an example
of a seriously misleading error unless the secured party relying
upon the defective filing can prove that during the entire period of
its purported effectiveness the defective filing if filed in accordance
with mandatory routine procedures in the respective filing office,
would be produced in response to a routine request in the legal
name of the debtor. The incorrect use of a corporate suffix is an
example of an error that is not necessarily seriously misleading.
Section 9-402(8) should generally be applied to save a defective
financingstatement only after a determination has been made that
a routine search of the record would reveal such filed financing
statement.

The Official Comment to the new Section 9-105(1)0) with respect to the definition for "legal name" should simply cross-reference
to Section 9-402 and the Official Comments thereto.
C. Recommendation Three: Administrative Measures

The primary obligations of the filing officers are set forth in
Sections 9-403(4) and (7) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1989
Official Text. Depending upon which Alternative Subsection (1) to
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Section 9-401 has been adopted in the state, filings are usually made
in the Office of the Secretary of State and may be made in the local,
usually county, office. By statute, the filing officer must index the
statements by name (as revised, the legal name) of the debtor. The
form that the respective offices use for filing purposes is modeled after the form set forth in Section 9-402(3): "A form substantially as
follows is sufficient to comply with subsection (1): .... ." The form
was previously described in relevant part in Recommendation
One. 3

7

On the authority of proposed Section 9-402(3),'6 8 administrative officers should revise the forms acceptable for filing by inserting
the word "Legal" before the word "Name" on the forms. To the
extent the particular state has given explicit authority to its administrative officers to devise the form and implement the purposes of Article 9, the administrative officers should further revise the form to
include all the changes recommended herein with respect to Section
9-402(3)36" even before legislative enactment thereof. Revising the
form in accordance with those recommendations will in itself provide
notice that the legal name of the debtor is required and that the
obligation to provide such information rests squarely with the secured party preparer. Setting forth a special line for the "trade
name, if any, of the debtor" helps the preparer to recognize the distinction between the legal name and the trade name. Such assistance
is beneficial until the practice of providing the legal name of the
debtor has become firmly established.
At the annual national convention of state filing officers, discussion could be initiated with respect to divergent filing and retrieval
methodologies with the objective of identifying uniform standards
and conventions for searches to compensate for such variations. The
standards are particularly important prior to legislative reform and
under the conflicting judicial interpretations of Sections 9-402(1)
and 9-402(8). For example, administrative corrections could be routinely made for search requests that may have erroneous corporate
suffixes. Particularly where computer systems have been installed, a
search for a name with one corporate suffix should automatically
trigger a search for the same name with alternate suffixes.37 0 An367.
368.
369.
370.

See
See
See
For

supra pp. 439-41.
id.
id.
example, a search under the name "The Shoe Store, Inc." should automatically

trigger a search under the names "The Shoe Store, Incorporated," "The Shoe Store Company,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

79

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:365

other type of administrative improvement would address the fact
that different filing systems are employed in the different states
which could have an impact on perceived name similarities. Ways to
reduce the disparity of outcome could be discussed and implemented
on an administrative level without compromising the filing officer's
ministerial functions. At the very least procedures could be adopted
for notifying the searcher of the manner in which searches are conducted in that office. This would be helpful to a searcher formulating
multiple requests based on perceived name similarities, particularly
where the search request is for a corporate name that appears to
include an individual's name. 71 Consensus could be obtained on
standard abbreviations. The policy of expanding searches to correct
secured party filers' errors could be discussed; expansive searches
and filings in multiple names of the same debtor should generally be
discouraged except for chronic and predictable variations such as
corporate suffixes and standard abbreviations.
D. Recommendation Four: Judicial Methodology For Applying
the Seriously Misleading Test
The sufficiency of a financing statement under Section 9-402(1)
should be determined within the context of its notice function and
the filing and search procedures employed by the state and county
offices in which the financing statement is filed. The capacity of the
financing statement to prevent a fraud on subsequent creditors
should be evaluated from a review of the financing statement itself,
after discovery in the files, not prima facie, prior to such discovery.
The function and procedures are objective criteria consistent with a
systematic approach; the latter circumstances are fairly subjective
and contrary to systematic or predictable results.
While perfect accuracy is not required by virtue of Section 9402(8), it is clear that not all errors are fatal. Section 9-402(8) provides: "A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor
errors which are not seriously misleading. 37 2 Errors that do not
cause subsequent creditors to be misled regarding the existence of a
prior secured claim in the debtor's property should not defeat the
validity of the earlier secured party's claim. Consistent with these
Inc.," and "The Shoe Store Co., Inc.," etc., without specific requests by the searcher.
371. For a discussion of the significance of filing procedures, see supra notes 4-19 and
accompanying text.

372. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1989).
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goals it is imperative that Section 9-402(8) not be prematurely applied to save defective financing statements that contain errors that
appear to be, but are not, minor.
Therefore, in determining whether a financing statement substantially complies with Code requirements, the courts should invoke
a two-tier process of analysis. It should be determined whether the
financing statement would be revealed at the time of the transaction
with the searching creditor by a routine search in the legal name of
the debtor in that jurisdiction. Relevant criteria include the legal
name of the debtor, the name provided on the financing statement as
the name of the debtor, and whether the financing statement that
was filed would be revealed by a search in the actual, legal name of
the debtor.
If the financing statement would be discovered, and if it contains errors, the second tier of Section 9-402(8) should then be applied to determine whether such errors are minor and not seriously
misleading, given the fact that the financing statement has accomplished its fundamental task of providing notice that a security interest may exist in the debtor's property. If a financing statement would
not be discovered in the course of a routine search, the financing
statement would fail in its essential purpose and give rise to the conclusive presumption, under the second tier of the analysis applying
Section 9-402(8), that the errors contained therein are not minor
and are seriously misleading.
This approach is distinguishable from that in which Section 9402(8) is applied as a first step in the analysis to inspect the financing statement for substantial compliance from the preparer's viewpoint. Such a prima facie approach focuses on the financing statement alone and outside the context of the notice filing system and is
vulnerable to subjective perceptions. Ironically, the fact that a financing statement may technically comply with the requirements of
the statute as presently stated and be saved by Section 9-402(8) even
though such compliance may actually prevent notice, elevates form
over substance in direct conflict with articulated goals of the U.C.C.
The savings provision of Section 9-402(8) should therefore not be
applied until after the threshold question of effective notice is resolved. Because a routinely discoverable name on the financing statement is the key to the entire notice system, subjective tests should be
discarded in favor of the objective standards of the two-tier analysis.
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E. Recommendation Five: Transactional Concerns
Lawyers representing the secured party at the transactional
stage should complete the financing statement by inserting the legal
name of the debtor in the space designated on the financing statement. The legal name should be verified by reference to appropriate
official documents, such as a current Certificate of Incorporation,
and confirmed by inspection of the debtor's business records. Such
documents are, or should be, routinely obtained in any event to verify the good standing of the business person within the state. The
confirmation represents an insignificant burden, if any, on the secured party. Since no challenges to the use of the legal name of the
debtor have been sustained by the courts, this procedure should be
observed to maximize the client's protected status.
Under the diverse range of judicial opinions with respect to secured party and subsequent creditor obligations, lawyers representing the subsequent creditor or searcher should take extra measures
to protect their clients' interests. It should be remembered that a
secured party at the transactional stage is also a potential subsequent creditor or searcher, and therefore these measures should also
be observed by the secured party filers. Searches should be conducted in the legal name of the debtor, and the search request and
results should be carefully documented in writing. Until legislation is
enacted or judicial consensus is achieved, a search should also be
conducted in the trade name or names known to the searcher and in
the legal name(s) the debtor has used within the previous five years.
All search requests and results should be adequately documented. If
the risk of nonpayment and the size of the debtor so warrant, the
attorney should investigate whether the relevant jurisdiction has applied a name similarity or physical or electronic proximity test to
validate defective financing statements, whether searches are conducted manually or electronically, and what filing procedures are implied, in order to formulate alternate search requests in a less haphazard fashion.
The savings provision of Section 9-402(8) is a valuable protective device for complying creditors, but must be applied consistently
with the goal of providing effective notice and protection to deserving
subsequent creditors as well. To the extent that all creditors are potential subsequent creditors, all creditors are burdened unnecessarily.
Judicial acceptance of the coherent systematic approach and two-tier
test proposed in this Article minimizes the burdens, maximizes the
benefits, and restores the balance of protections intended in Section
9-402.
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